The liquidity-coverage ratio (LCR) requires banks to hold enough liquidity to withstand a 30-day run. We study the effects of the LCR on broker-dealers, the financial intermediaries at the epicenter of the 2007–2009 crisis. The LCR brings some financial-stability benefits, including a significant maturity extension of triparty repos backed by lower-quality collateral, as well as the accumulation of larger liquidity pools. However, it also leads to less liquidity transformation by broker-dealers. We also discuss the liquidity risks not addressed by the LCR. Finally, we show that a major source of fire-sale risk was self-corrected before the introduction of postcrisis regulations.

We use variation in state corporate income tax rates to re-examine the relation between taxes and corporate leverage. Contrary to prior research, corporate leverage rises after tax cuts for small private firms. An estimated dynamic equilibrium model shows that tax cuts make capital more productive and spur the use of leverage. Tax cuts also produce more distant default thresholds and lower credit spreads. These effects outweigh the lower interest tax deduction and lead to higher optimal leverage choices, especially for firms with flexible investment policies. The presence of the interest tax deduction raises consumer welfare in equilibrium.