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An Empirical Model of Sectoral Movements by Unemployed Workers

Journal of Labor Economics 1996 14(1), 126-153
Using Canadian data, I investigate the relationships among sectoral mobility, unemployment spells, and total unemployment. Recent North American evidence suggests that incidence shifts toward high wage-high tenure workers may increase equilibrium unemployment through decreasing sectoral mobility and increasing spells. Using a multiple spell transition model, I find that, while shifts toward such workers may have these effects, composition changes that lead to higher mobility can also increase unemployment. A further investigation into the relative roles of mobility and spell lengths in driving total unemployment indicates that the influence of the former is comparatively small.

Pricing Errors at the NYSE Open and Close: Evidence from Internationally Cross-Listed Stocks

Journal of Financial Intermediation 1996 5(2), 95-126
The variances of pricing errors (transitory changes in prices) at the NYSE open and the close are analyzed for U.S. stocks that are traded in London or Tokyo, British and Japanese stocks that are listed on the NYSE, and U.S. stocks that are not traded abroad. The variance of pricing errors is significantly greater at the open than at the close for U.S. stocks, but not foreign stocks. These differences are explained by differences in order flow at the open and the close, a relation that is the same whether stocks are foreign or domestic and whether they trade abroad or notJournal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G10, D23.

The Interdependent Use of Earnings and Dividends in Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Contemporary Accounting Research 1996 13(2), 435-456
This paper examines how analysts combine earnings and dividend information when they predict future earnings. Because both earnings and dividends are noisy indications of future earnings, we posit that analysts use the two corroboratively, to confirm the information reflected in each, and that analysts will substitute away from earnings when it is noisy and toward dividends. Using regressions of analysts' earnings forecast revisions on unexpected earnings, unexpected dividends, and five variables that reflect whether the signs of unexpected earnings and dividends confirm or contradict each other, we find evidence of both corroboration and substitution. Analysts' earnings forecast revisions are significantly related to the five corroborative variables, and this relation has statistically significant explanatory power beyond that in the magnitudes of unexpected earnings and unexpected dividends. Consistent with expectations, we find that the evidence of corroboration varies across the noisiness of earnings information; there is more evidence of corroboration when earnings are more variable. We also find evidence consistent with analysts substituting away from earnings, toward dividend information for firms with noisy earnings information (high variance). Overall, the results imply that analysts use earnings and dividend information interdependently, with some interdependency determined by the noisiness of earnings announcements. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent comment les analystes combinent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes pour prévoir les bénéfices futurs. Les bénéfices et les dividendes étant tous deux des indicateurs imparfaits des bénéfices futurs, les auteurs posent l'hypothèse que les analystes utilisent les deux, à titre corroboratif, pour confirmer l'information que livre chacun de ces indicateurs et qu'ils préféreront les dividendes aux bénéfices, si ces derniers se révèlent un indicateur imparfait. En procédant à la régression des révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes sur les bénéfices imprévus, sur les dividendes imprévus et sur cinq variables indiquant si les pronostics de bénéfices et de dividendes imprévus se confirment ou s'infirment les uns les autres, les auteurs enregistrent des données qui vont à la fois dans le sens de la corroboration et de la substitution. Les révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes présentent une relation significative avec les cinq variables de corroboration, relation qui affiche un pouvoir d'explication statistiquement significatif, au‐delà de celui de l'ampleur des bénéfices imprévus et des dividendes imprévus. Conformément aux prévisions, les auteurs constatent que la preuve de corroboration varie selon le degré d'imperfection de l'information relative aux bénéfices; les preuves de corroboration sont plus fortes lorsque les bénéfices varient davantage. Les auteurs font également état de constatations conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les ana lystes écartent l'information relative aux bénéfices pour y substituer l'information relative aux dividendes dans le cas d'entreprises dont l'information relative aux bénéfices est imparfaite (variance élevée). Dans l'ensemble, les résultats invitent à la conclusion que les analystes utilisent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes de manière interdépendante, une partie de cette interdépendance étant déterminée par l'imperfection de l'information communiquée en ce qui a trait aux bénéfices.

Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision Horizon

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1996 31(4), 467
This paper investigates the relation between the form of compensation and the manager's decision horizon. It finds that while all-cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long term, all-stock contracts induce overinvestment in the long term. It shows that compensation contracts consisting of both cash and restricted stock can produce efficient investment, thereby providing a rationale for the existence of both cash and stock incentive schemes in executive compensation packages. This explains why the adoption of either type of incentive scheme results in a positive stock price reaction. In addition, the paper derives the following testable hypotheses: i) the proportion of the stock compensation is decreasing in the precision of the manager's ability and increasing in the precision of the firm's cash flows; ii) firms compensate their managers with proportionately more stock in profitable years and proportionately more cash in leaner years; and iii) the greater the growth opportunities, the higher the proportion of stock compensation.

Is Fixed Investment the Key to Economic Growth?

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1996 111(1), 269-276 open access
This paper examines shares of fixed capital formation in GDP and rates of economic growth for more than 100 countries over successive five-year periods between 1965 and 1985 to determine the direction of causality between them. Simple regressions and multiple regressions including several standard determinants of growth, as well as a simple causality test, provide more evidence that increases in growth precede rises in rates of capital formation than that increases in capital formation precede increases in growth. High rates of fixed capital formation accompany rapid growth in per capita income, but we find no evidence that fixed investment is the only or main source of ignition for economic growth.

Recession‐Induced Stress and the Prediction of Corporate Failure*

Contemporary Accounting Research 1996 13(2), 631-650
In this paper we examine whether the occurrence of recession‐induced stress is an incrementally informative factor that contributes to the predictive and explanatory power of accounting‐based failure prediction models. We show that accounting‐based statistical models used to predict corporate failure are sensitive to the occurrence of a recession. Moreover, after controlling for the intertemporally unconditioned “stressed” and “unstressed” types of corporate failure, we find that models conditioned on the occurrence of a recession still add incremental explanatory power in predicting the likelihood of corporate failure. This source‐related characterization of stress appears distinct from other types of corporate failure that have been identified. Résumé. Les auteurs se demandent si l'occurrence du stress amené par la récession est un facteur qui apporte une information supplémentaire contribuant au pouvoir prédictif et explicatif des modèles de prévision des faillites reposant sur la comptabilité. Ils montrent que les modèles statistiques fondés sur la comptabilité utilisés pour prévoir les faillites des entreprises sont sensibles à l'occurrence d'une récession. De plus, une fois contrôlée la nature de la faillite de l'entreprise — faillite annoncée par le stress et faillite non annoncée par le stress sans conditionnement intertemporel —, les auteurs en viennent à la conclusion que les modèles conditionnés par l'occurrence d'une récession ont encore un pouvoir explicatif accru dans la prédiction de la probabilité de faillite de l'entreprise. Cette définition du stress liée à la source semble différente des autres types de faillite de l'entreprise qui ont été cernés.

The Marketing of Closed-end Fund IPOs: Evidence from Transactions Data

Journal of Financial Intermediation 1996 5(2), 127-159
We examine aftermarket transactions for closed-end fund IPOs and document large sell-to-buy imbalances (“flipping”), extensive price stabilization, and sharp subsequent price drops. The timing of the price drop is related to both the amount of initial flipping, and use of the over-allotment options. The extent of the flipping activity is related to the composition of the syndicate. Moreover, aftermarket buys (sells) are mainly small (large) trades. These findings suggest that lead underwriters price stabilize and manage the supply of shares in the aftermarket, and that closed-end fund IPOs are marketed to a poorly informed public.

Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

Review of Economic Studies 1996 63(2), 265
We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.