Diversification by banks affects the systemic risk of the sector. Importantly, Wagner (2010) shows that linear diversification increases systemic risk. We consider the case of securitization, whereby loan portfolios are sliced into tranches with different seniority levels. We show that tranching offers nonlinear diversification strategies, which can reduce the failure risk of individual institutions beyond the minimum level attainable by linear diversification without increasing systemic risk.

We estimate a panel error correction model for loan loss provisions, using unique supervisory data on flow of funds into and out of the allowance for loan losses of 25 Dutch banks in the post-2008 crisis period. We find that these banks aim for an allowance of 49% of impaired loans. In the short run, however, the adjustment of the allowance is only 29% of the change in impaired loans. The deviation from the target is made up by (a) larger additions to allowances in subsequent quarters and (b) smaller reversals of allowances when loan losses do not materialize. After one quarter, the adjustment toward the target level is 32%, and after four quarters it is 79%. For individual banks, there are substantial differences in timing of provisioning for bad loan losses.

We test for the presence of a systematic tail risk premium in the cross section of expected returns by applying a measure of the sensitivity of assets to extreme market downturns, the tail beta. Empirically, historical tail betas help predict the future performance of stocks in extreme market downturns. During a market crash, stocks with historically high tail betas suffer losses that are approximately 2 to 3 times larger than their low-tail-beta counterparts. However, we find no evidence of a premium associated with tail betas. The theoretically additive and empirically persistent tail betas can help assess portfolio tail risks.

Privacy is a feature inherent to the use of cash. With steadily increasing market shares of digital payment platforms, privacy in payments may no longer be attainable in the future. We explore the potential welfare impacts of reductions in privacy in payments. In our framework, firms may use data collected through payments to price discriminate future consumers. A public good aspect arises because individuals do not internalize the full cost of failing to protect their privacy and reduce social welfare by suboptimally choosing not to protect their privacy in payments. We discuss potential remedies, including the issuance of electronic cash.

This paper develops the concept of a “crypto multiplier,” which measures the equilibrium response of a cryptocurrency’s market capitalization to aggregate inflows and outflows of investors’ funds. The crypto multiplier takes high values when a large share of a cryptocurrency’s coins is held as an investment rather than being used as a means of payment. Blockchain data show that the share of coins held for the purpose of making payments is rather small for major cryptocurrencies suggesting large crypto multipliers. Our results highlight the need for market participants to be vigilant when accepting block holdings of a cryptocurrency as collateral or as compensation for seed funding. The crypto multiplier indicates that the liquidation value of block holdings of cryptocurrencies can be substantially below their prevailing market values.

This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between bank profitability and economic activity. When allowing for stronger co-movement of bank profit with economic activity during deep recessions, we find a much larger impact of output growth on bank profitability than commonly found in the literature. Among the different components of bank profit, loan losses are the main driver of this result. We also find long-term interest rates in previous years to be important determinants of bank profit in times of high economic growth. Our findings are robust to the use of aggregate or individual bank data.