In this paper, we investigate the real effects of special taxation on banks. We provide evidence that the introduction of a new fiscal levy on banks significantly impairs their performance and has an adverse impact on the real economy through the lending channel. Using micro-level data on lending relationships, we identify the credit supply shock related with a bank tax controlling for loan demand factors. We compute a firm-specific measure of firm exposure to burdened credit institutions. We find a negative impact of the tax shock on investment and output. Our results are important from a policy perspective as they shed light on the economic consequences of double taxation on banks.

We investigate the impact of a new bank tax in Poland on bank lending behavior. We find that banks respond to the tax by tightening credit supply and increasing the costs of credit to the real sector. However, the responses vary across loan segments. In line with search-for-yield behavior, the tax motivates banks to shift their allocations of household credit from low-margin and relatively safe mortgage loans to higher-margin and riskier consumer loans. We find no evidence that financially weak banks are more incentivized to shift to riskier loan types. Moreover, firms that receive loans from banks more exposed to the tax experience a greater credit contraction.

This study examines the relationship between family firms and carbon emissions using a large cross-country dataset of 6600 non-financial firms over the period 2010–2019. We find that family firms emit less carbon than non-family firms, especially after the Paris Agreement. Several factors contribute to this outcome, including governance structure, the degree of family control, R&D spending, and the issuance of green patents. Our study also shows that despite lower carbon emissions, family firms have lower environmental scores, primarily due to their reduced public commitment to emission reduction. Both environmental scores and carbon emissions increase when non-family CEOs are appointed and when family ownership decreases, indicating that agency conflicts may influence these outcomes.