[This paper characterizes when joint financing of two projects through debt increases expected default costs, contrary to conventional wisdom. Separate financing dominates joint financing when risk-contamination losses—that are associated with the contagious default of a well-performing project that is dragged down by the other project's poor performance—outweigh standard coinsurance gains. Separate financing becomes more attractive than joint financing when the fraction of returns lost under default increases and when projects have lower mean returns, higher variability, more positive correlation, and more negative skewness. These predictions are broadly consistent with evidence on conglomerate mergers, spinoffs, project finance, and securitization.]

The logic of the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982) extends to price discrimination. A non-linear pricing monopolist who sells to a single buyer always prefers to commit to publicly reveal information affiliated to the valuation of the buyer. This is also valid when the value of the buyer affects the opportunity cost of the seller.

Financial advice could play an essential role in well-functioning markets for retail financial products, given that many consumers find it difficult to evaluate the complex products on offer. However, conflicts of interest, which are pervasive in some parts of the industry, can turn advice into a curse rather than a blessing for consumers, especially when consumers are not sufficiently wary. Through a simple model of financial advice, we overview the pros and cons of various policy interventions, such as imposing mandatory disclosure, banning commissions, and regulating contract cancellation terms.

This paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products. Our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers, even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice. When customers are wary of the adviser's incentives, contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers. If, instead, customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice, high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation. Policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare. However, prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser's incentive to acquire information. More vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation, but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers.

The article develops a model of nonmarket allocation of resources such as the awarding of grants to meritorious projects, honors to outstanding students, or journal slots to quality publications. On the supply side, the available budget of grants is awarded to applicants who are evaluated most favorably according to the noisy information available to reviewers. On the demand side, stronger candidates are more likely to obtain grants and thus self-select into applying, given that applications are costly. We establish that if evaluation is perfect, grading on a curve inefficiently discourages even the very best candidates from applying. More generally, when the budget is insufficient to award grants to all applicants, the equilibrium unravels if information is symmetric enough—the paradox of relative evaluation. Leveraging a technique based on the quantile function pioneered by Lehmann, we characterize a broad set of nonmarket allocation rules under which an increase in evaluation noise in a field (or course) raises equilibrium applications in that field, and reduces applications in all other fields. We empirically confirm these comparative statics by exploiting a change in the rule for apportioning the total budget to applications in different fields at the European Research Council, showing that a 1 standard deviation increase in own evaluation noise leads to a 0.4 standard deviation increase in the number of applications and budget share. Moreover, we derive insights for the design of evaluation institutions, particularly regarding the endogenous choice of noise by fields or courses and the optimal aggregation of fields into panels.

An informer sequentially collects and disseminates information through costly research to persuade an evaluator to approve an activity. Payoffs and control rights are split between informer and evaluator depending on the organizational rules governing the approval process. The welfare benchmark corresponds to Wald’s classic solution for a statistician with payoff equal to the sum of informer and evaluator. Organizations with different commitment power of informer and evaluator are compared from a positive and normative perspective. Granting authority to the informer is socially optimal when information acquisition is sufficiently costly. The analysis is applied to the regulatory process for drug approval.

In markets for retail financial products and health services, consumers often rely on the advice of intermediaries to decide which specialized offering best fits their needs. Product providers, in turn, compete to influence the intermediaries' advice through hidden kickbacks or disclosed commissions. Motivated by the controversial role of these widespread practices, we formulate a model to analyze competition through commissions from a positive and normative standpoint. The model highlights the role of commissions in making the advisor responsive to supply-side incentives. We characterize situations when commonly adopted policies such as mandatory disclosure and caps on commissions have unintended welfare consequences.

This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's “suitability” for the specific needs of customers. When structuring salesforce compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from “misselling” unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives.

In an influential paper, David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein (1990) modeled sequential investment by agents concerned about their reputation as good forecasters. Consider an agent who acts after observing the behavior of another ex ante identical agent. Scharfstein and Stein argue that reputational herding requires that better agents have more correlated signals conditionally on the state of the world. They claim that without correlation the second agent would have no incentive to attempt to manipulate the market inference about ability by imitating the behavior of the first agent. In this Note we show that in their model, correlation is not necessary for herding, other than in degenerate cases. Our clarification exploits a parallel with statistical herding, introduced by Abhijit V. Banerjee (1992) and Sushil Bikhchandani et al. (1992) (henceforth, BHW). BHW feature investors who maximize expected profits in a common-value environment and have access to conditionally independent private signals of bounded precision, while still observing the behavior of others. Eventually, the evidence accumulated from observing earlier decisions is sufficiently strong to swamp the private information of a single decision maker. Thereafter, everyone rationally copies the prevailing behavior. We notice that payoffs have a common-value nature in both the statistical and the reputational model. The observed behavior of other agents possibly affects the probability belief attached to different states of the world as well as the payoff conditional on each state. Herding arises from the interaction of these two channels affecting the expected payoff, be it physical or reputational. Positive differential conditional correlation of signals in the reputational model is tantamount to the introduction of positive payoff externalities in the statistical model. This reinforces the tendency to herd already present with independence. The fact that differential conditional correlation is not needed for herding is a clear strength of the reputational herding model. It is not necessary to assume common unpredictable components of returns at the individual level in order to rationalize the empirical findings that individual prediction errors of security analysts are correlated. After setting up Scharfstein and Stein’s model in Section I, we summarize their findings in Section II and provide a unified definition of herd behavior in Section III. Section IV contains our critique of their line of argument and clarifies the role of differential conditional correlation. In Section V we propose alternative robust scenarios where herding would indeed be driven by correlation. Section VI concludes.