We show that firms with executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are not offset by higher SOC. Our results suggest that 162(m) tax incentives are an important determinant of the decision to expense SOC.

One consequence of the shift to fair value measurement is the emergence of voluntary disclosures in audited financial statements that question the reliability of mandated fair value information. We refer to these disclosures as reliability disavowals. We examine stock option volatility estimates disclosed under SFAS 123 and test whether disavowals are informative (opportunistic) by examining whether ex ante firm characteristics, forecast bias, and prediction difficulty are consistent with informative (opportunistic) disclosure. Our results support the hypothesis that disavowals inform users about the reliability of volatility estimates, but there is also limited evidence consistent with managers using disavowals opportunistically.

This study examines the effect of ongoing deregulation in the electric utility industry on the relation between market value, book value, and earnings. We predict that deregulation decreases (increases) the relative importance of book value (earnings) in explaining price. We test this prediction by examining changes in the value relevance of book value and earnings during the 1988–1996 time period for a sample of large, investor-owned electric utilities. We find that the regression coefficients and incremental explanatory power related to book value (earnings) have decreased (increased) over this time period. These results are generally robust in sensitivity analysis.

Corporate conference calls are large-scale telephone conference calls during which managers make presentations to and answer questions from various market participants, usually about earnings. In this paper, we sample 1,056 corporate conference calls made by 808 firms during February-November 1995 to provide evidence on three questions: (1) whether conference calls provide information to stock market participants, (2) whether investors have equal access to the information provided during these calls, and (3) why managers of some firms hold conference calls while managers of other firms do not. We believe this research is important because managers' use of conference calls has grown enormously, yet we know little about how these calls affect investors.1

This study evaluates corporate voluntary disclosure of forward‐looking information under the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Using a sample of 523 computer hardware, computer software, and pharmaceutical firms, we find a significant increase in both the frequency of firms issuing earnings and sales forecasts and the mean number of forecasts issued following the Act’s passage. To provide more direct evidence that our findings are attributable to the Act reducing firms’ legal exposure, we develop a proxy for litigation risk and examine whether the increase in disclosure is more pronounced for firms at greatest risk of a lawsuit. As expected, we find that the change in disclosure is increasing in firms’ ex ante risk of litigation. Finally, we report that the safe harbor had no adverse impact on the quality of forward‐looking information. Forecast errors, whether directional or non‐directional, were not significantly affected by the Act’s passage.

Implementation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Auditing Standards No. 2 on internal control and No. 3 on documentation has delayed audit completion. However, due to market demand for timely disclosures, most firms maintain the same preliminary earnings release date even though the audit may not be complete as of that date. Results indicate revisions to preliminary announcements when filing the 10-K report would have been 35% lower during 2005 if the historical frequency of issuing earnings releases after the audit report date had not changed. Additionally, stock market reaction to impending revisions suggests lower reliability of preliminary earnings.

This paper examines whether auditor fees are associated with earnings management and the market reaction to the disclosure of auditor fees. Using data collected from proxy statements, we present evidence that nonaudit fees are positively associated with small earnings surprises and the magnitude of discretionary accruals, while audit fees are negatively associated with these earnings management indicators. We also find evidence of a negative association between nonaudit fees and share values on the date the fees were disclosed, although the effect is small in economic terms.