A faster exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. On the one hand, speed enables a high-frequency market maker (HFM) to update quotes faster on incoming news. This reduces payoff risk and thus lowers the competitive bid-ask spread. On the other hand, HFM price quotes are more likely to meet speculative high-frequency bandits, and thus are less likely to meet liquidity traders. This raises the spread. The net effect of exchange speed depends on a security's news-to-liquidity-trader ratio.

We study fee competition between an incumbent and entrant central counterparty (CCP) under two regimes: interoperability (trades clear at each party’s own CCP) and preferred clearing (trades clear at the incumbent unless both counterparties choose otherwise). Preferred clearing creates network effects that force the entrant to undercut aggressively, while the incumbent sustains higher fees. Fee spreads, average trading costs, and industry profits increase under preferred clearing. However, interoperability is costly because linked CCPs must post collateral against cross-CCP exposure. Interoperability improves welfare when link costs are either low or high enough that the incumbent drops fees to reduce clearing fragmentation.

Supranational resolution of insolvent banks does not necessarily improve welfare. Supranational regulators are more inclined to bail-out banks indebted towards international creditors because they take into account cross-border contagion. When banks’ creditors are more likely to be bailed out, market discipline decreases and risk-taking by indebted banks increases. Depending on the trade-off between giving the right incentives ex ante and limiting contagion ex post, both a national and a supranational resolution framework can be optimal. In particular, if market discipline is low under both national and supranational resolution mechanisms, supranational resolution improves welfare as it stimulates interbank trade.

Limit order markets use a queuing system in which limit orders must wait in line to execute. We show that the queue position of a limit order influences its adverse selection risk and inhibits inventory risk management. Trade may worsen market maker risk sharing, unlike many protocols without queuing. We uncover a crowding-out effect: An inventory shock reduces liquidity provision by market makers later in the queue. Using futures data, we confirm both low risk sharing and the crowding-out effect. These two results imply a trade-off, as the queuing sequence that optimizes risk sharing decreases quoted depth up to 8.4%. • Queue position affects adverse-selection risk and inventory management. • Market-maker risk sharing may worsen due to queuing. • Inventory shocks reduce liquidity provision later in the queue. • Canadian futures data confirm low risk sharing and crowding-out effects. • Optimizing risk sharing lowers quoted depth by up to 8.4%.

We analyze how ETFs compete. Drawing on a new model and empirical analysis, we show that ETF secondary market liquidity plays a key role in determining fees. More liquid ETFs for a given index charge higher fees and attract short-horizon investors who are more sensitive to liquidity than to fees. Higher turnover from these investors sustains the ETF’s high liquidity, allowing the ETF to extract a rent through its fee, and creating a first-mover advantage. Liquidity segmentation through clientele effects generates welfare losses. Our findings resolve the apparent paradox that higher-fee ETFs not only survive but also flourish in equilibrium.

A faster exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. On the one hand, speed enables a high-frequency market maker (HFM) to update quotes faster on incoming news. This reduces payoff risk and thus lowers the competitive bid-ask spread. On the other hand, HFM price quotes are more likely to meet speculative high-frequency bandits, and thus are less likely to meet liquidity traders. This raises the spread. The net effect of exchange speed depends on a security's news-to-liquidity-trader ratio.