ABSTRACT Based on the theoretical framework of Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007), I predict that higher earnings quality of economically related public firms reduces a firm's systematic market risk. Using alternative sets of economically related firms, this study provides significant evidence consistent with my prediction. Specifically, a conditional CAPM regression shows that not only a firm's earnings quality, but also the earnings quality of related public firms lowers the loading of firm excess return on the market factor. Regressions based on the three-factor model provide similar results. Further, I provide evidence on cross-sectional variations in the effect of related firms' earnings quality. These results are economically significant and robust in several additional tests. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence on the long-term externalities of financial information quality in the capital market. Data Availability: All analyses are based on publicly available data.

Accounting Standards Update No. 2016–02 (ASU 2016–02) generated considerable debate between managers and standard setters. We find evidence that after issuance of ASU 2016–02, lessee firms decreased their use of long-term operating leases, increased their use of short-term operating leases, and increased their use of capital expenditures. The shift from long-term operating leases to capital expenditures is more pronounced for firms that had greater reporting incentives to use operating leases prior to ASU 2016–02. However, we find no evidence that the change in leasing behavior leads to negative outcomes predicted by managers (i.e., no evidence of a decrease in reported firm performance, a decrease in firm value, increase in firm risk, decrease in credit ratings, increase in debt covenant violations, or decrease in employment). Our study adds to the literature on the real impacts of accounting standards on managers' investment behavior and economic consequences for lessee firms and their stakeholders.

ABSTRACT To “crack down” on tax havens and offshore financial centers, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has promoted an internationally agreed tax standard of exchange of information on request since 2009. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that the implementation of the standard significantly reduces aggressive tax avoidance by affected U.S. multinational firms with material subsidiaries in tax havens and other offshore financial centers. The effects are stronger when firms have more incentives and opportunities for income-shifting or when tax enforcement is stronger. Overall, our study helps the OECD and other regulators better understand the effect of the internationally agreed standard on corporate tax avoidance. Data Availability: All data are available at the source indicated.

To constrain the use of intangible assets in tax-motivated state income shifting, many U.S. state governments adopted addback statutes. Addback statutes reduce the tax benefits that firms can gain from creating intangible assets such as patents. Using a sample of U.S. public firms, we examine the effect of addback statutes on corporate innovation behavior. First, the adoption of addback statutes leads to a 4.77 percentage point decrease in the number of patents and a 5.12 percentage point decrease in the number of patent citations. Second, the “disappearing patents” resulting from addback statutes have significant economic value. Third, after a state adopts an addback statute, a firm with material subsidiaries in that state assigns fewer patents to subsidiaries in zero-tax states, whereas the number of patents assigned to the other states does not change. Overall, our findings suggest that addback statutes impede corporate innovation.

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.

This study tests the relation between corporate tax avoidance and disclosure of geographic earnings for U.S. multinational companies. We find that after the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 in 1998, firms opting to discontinue disclosure of geographic earnings in their financial reports have lower worldwide effective tax rates. These results are consistent with managers perceiving that non-disclosure of geographic earnings helps mask tax avoidance behavior. However, the relation between tax avoidance and non-disclosure reduces after implementation of Schedule M-3 in the annual corporate tax filing beginning in 2004. Schedule M-3 requires a detailed reconciliation of book income to tax income and aims to make firms' tax avoidance activities associated with shifting profits to lower-tax foreign jurisdictions more apparent to the IRS. This study contributes to our understanding of the relation between financial reporting behavior and tax reporting behavior.