Banks (but not stock markets) promote economic growth by facilitating relationship-specific investment between buyers and suppliers of intermediate goods. Combined insights from literature on signaling role of banks and on relationship-specific investment motivate this economic channel: A supplier is reluctant to undertake relationship-specific investment as she cannot observe financial stability and planning horizon of buyer. Banks can mitigate this information asymmetry. Empirical results from twenty-eight industries in ninety countries confirm that industries dependent on relationship-specific investment from their suppliers grow disproportionately faster in countries with a well-developed banking sector. The channel works via increased entry of new firms and higher capital accumulation.

Can financial institutions and markets enhance the discipline imposed by competitive product markets and thus improve resource allocation in the real economy? We address this question in the context of international trade, using disaggregated product-level data from seventy-one countries exporting to the USA. We show that exported products exit the US market sooner if they stand far away from the exporting country’s comparative advantage. This pattern is stronger when the exporting country has a well-developed banking system, but it is unaffected by the depth of stock markets. These results are in accordance with theories stressing the disciplining role of debt and monitoring abilities of banks.