The financial crisis prompted widespread interest in developing a better understanding of how capital regulation drives bank behavior. This paper uses a unique, comprehensive database of regulatory capital requirements on all UK banks to examine their effects on capital, lending and balance sheet management behavior. We find that capital requirements that include firm-specific, time-varying add-ons set by supervisors affect banks’ desired capital ratios and that resulting adjustments to capital and lending depend on the gap between actual and target ratios. We use these results to measure the effects of a capital regime that includes features similar to those embedded in the UK framework. Our results suggest that countercyclical capital requirements may be less effective in slowing credit activity when banks can readily satisfy them with lower-quality (lower-costing) capital elements versus higher-quality common equity. Given the size of the UK banking sector and the global nature of many of the largest institutions in the UK banking sector, the results have implications for the ongoing debate surrounding the design and calibration of international capital standards.

Following FCC pressure to end bill shock, cellular carriers now alert customers when they exceed usage allowances. We estimate a model of plan choice, usage, and learning using a 2002–2004 panel of cellular bills. Accounting for firm price adjustment, we predict that implementing alerts in 2002–2004 would have lowered average annual consumer welfare by $33. We show that consumers are inattentive to past usage, meaning that bill-shock alerts are informative. Additionally, our estimates imply that consumers are overconfident, underestimating the variance of future calling. Overconfidence costs consumers $76 annually at 2002–2004 prices. Absent overconfidence, alerts would have little to no effect.

At‐scale field experiments at major U.K. banks show that automatic enrollment into “just‐in‐time” text alerts reduces unarranged overdraft and unpaid item charges 17% to 19% and arranged overdraft charges 4% to 8%, implying annual market‐wide savings of £170 million to £240 million. Incremental benefits from “early‐warning” alerts are statistically insignificant, although economically significant effects are not ruled out. Prior to the experiments, over half of overdrafts could have been avoided by using lower‐cost liquidity available in savings and credit card accounts. Alerts help consumers achieve less than half of these potential savings.