We study the impact of an urban land titling program on firm investment in Shenzhen, China. We find that this program increased the investment rate for titling firms, but this positive effect only holds for politically connected firms. Further analysis suggests that the titling effect is more pronounced for those titling firms associated with greater expropriation risk. During program implementation, the connected titling firms increased their investment perhaps because, as observed, they experienced fewer disputes than non-connected titling firms.

This paper explores the interplay between politics and law enforcement in China and its effects on firm financing decisions. By examining a sample of corporate lawsuits involving listed firms in China, we find that politically connected firms are less likely to be defendants, have higher win rates, and experience shorter litigation durations than non-connected firms. Additionally, we observe that firms with higher legal risk extend more accounts receivable and receive less accounts payable, but this relationship holds only for non-connected firms. Our findings support the financing advantage theory for politically connected firms and the legal risk compensation view for non-connected firms. Moreover, reforms in China's judicial system do not appear to mitigate the disadvantages faced by non-connected firms in terms of lawsuit outcomes and trade credit provision. Our findings suggest that well-functioned judicial independence might be still lacking in China, and that political connections continue to negatively impact law enforcement and corporate policies.

We use matched employer-employee data to study the role of the firm in the transmission of income growth into consumption growth. We find that growth in income relative to the firm average (the within-firm component) translates significantly less into consumption than growth in firm average income (the between-firm component). These findings are explained by the lower persistence of the within-firm component of income, better self-insurance for workers more exposed to variations in income growth from the within-firm component, and peer effects in the workplace. Quantitatively, income persistence provides 43% of the explanatory power, self-insurance provides 35%, and peer effects provide 22%.

We run an experiment to elicit preferences over state-contingent timed payouts. We analyze the data using a new revealed preference method (building on Nishimura et al., 2017) that can test for consistency with utility functions that increase with a given preorder. We find that correlation neutrality, a property implied by discounted expected utility, is widely violated and there is, instead, strong evidence of intertemporal correlation averse behavior. Our results suggest that utility is not additive across both states and time and that credible models of choice need to allow people to prefer negative correlation in timed payouts.