In 2012, Congress passed Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21), which changed the ERISA pension funding rules such that mandatory pension contributions decreased. Advocates for the bill argued that reducing mandatory contributions would increase firms' investment. In contrast, I do not find an average increase in investment among the firms benefiting from MAP-21. Rather, I find that firms either hold pension funding relief on their balance sheets as liquid assets or pay out pension funding relief to shareholders. To the extent that managers increase investment in response to MAP-21, it is concentrated in firms with weak governance or ineffective internal controls.

In April 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) was enacted to help revitalize the initial public offering (IPO) market, especially for small firms. During the year ending March 2014, IPO volume and the proportion of small firm issuers was the largest since 2000. Controlling for market conditions, we estimate that the JOBS Act has led to 21 additional IPOs annually, a 25% increase over pre-JOBS levels. Firms with high proprietary disclosure costs, such as biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, increase IPO activity the most. These firms are also more likely to take advantage of the act׳s de-risking provisions, allowing firms to file the IPO confidentially while testing-the-waters.

We examine whether Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) financial statement disclosure alters local governments' economic decision-making. To do so, we exploit a recent GASB standard that eliminated differences in the disclosure requirements for county governments' pension obligations. The standard, GASB 68, had no effect on pension economics or the annual budget—it affected only whether and how information was presented on GASB financial statements. Using a broad hand-collected dataset, we document that counties that did not disclose information about their pension obligations before GASB 68 reduced public welfare expenditures, employment, and salary expenses relative to those that had disclosed such information. We conduct extensive field research and employ several cross-sectional analyses to conclude that the effects we document are in part driven by increased awareness of the financial costs of pension obligations by newly disclosing counties.

We examine the effect of IPO proceeds on post-IPO liquidity and market monitoring. To do so we exploit variation in the amount of proceeds raised that is unrelated to firm size and manager decisions using an instrumental variable approach. We find that marginal increases in IPO proceeds lead to large increases in liquidity, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership in the first two years a firm is public. Increases in IPO proceeds also lead to more frequent follow-on offerings and longer survival as a public firm. We find evidence that immediate shocks to ownership dispersion represent one plausible channel through which changes in IPO proceeds affect long-run liquidity and market monitoring. Overall, our findings support the theoretical liquidity and market quality benefits associated with reductions in ownership concentration.

The JOBS Act allows certain analysts to be more involved in the IPO process, but does not relax restrictions on analyst compensation structure. We find that these analysts initiate coverage that is more optimistically biased, less accurate, and generates smaller stock market reactions. Investors purchasing shares following these initiations lose over 3% of their investment by the firm's subsequent earnings release. By contrast, issuers, analysts, and investment banks appear to benefit from this increased bias, as optimism is more positively associated with proxies for firm visibility and investment banking revenues when analysts are involved in the IPO process.

We study the real effects on innovation of a transformative change in corporate disclosure dissemination, the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system. On the one hand, increased disclosure dissemination can lower firms’ cost of capital, thereby stimulating innovative activity. On the other hand, increased dissemination can exacerbate proprietary disclosure costs, reducing firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that treated firms reduce innovation investment following EDGAR’s implementation. In contrast, EDGAR reporting firms’ innovation investment cuts are met with an increase in innovation investment by their technology rivals. Consistent with an increase in proprietary costs, EDGAR-filers disclose less about their innovation activities. We also find evidence of a redistribution of innovative activity from public to private firms not subject to EDGAR disclosure requirements. Overall, our results are consistent with increased disclosure dissemination crowding out investment in innovative projects, whose returns negatively depend on information spillovers.

Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation to their median employee's compensation in the annual proxy statement. Exploiting the staggered reporting of pay ratios, we find little evidence that total CEO compensation changes in response to pay ratio disclosure reform. However, we do find that boards significantly adjust the mix of compensation awarded by reducing the sensitivity of CEO pay to equity price changes, particularly when the CEO is likely to garner media scrutiny, and by reducing reliance on stock‐based and other compensation components that are most susceptible to media coverage surrounding the pay ratio disclosure. Firms ultimately disclosing higher pay ratios garner more media coverage around the filing of their proxy statement, and more negative‐toned coverage in the subsequent month. Finally, we find evidence that greater pay disparity is associated with greater selling activity by retail investors and more negative say‐on‐pay votes following pay ratio reform, consistent with a broad set of investors responding to public scrutiny resulting from pay ratio disclosures.

This paper examines the informativeness of special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) revenue forecasts. We document a positive association between the compound annual growth rate in revenue forecasts and abnormal returns, retail trading, and Twitter activity in the five-day window surrounding the disclosure of a merger announcement. By contrast, we find limited evidence that institutional investors and traditional information intermediaries respond to SPAC revenue forecasts. We also find evidence that SPAC revenue forecasts positively predict future operating underperformance, stock underperformance, and class action lawsuits. Overall, our results affirm the SEC’s concerns about the attractiveness of aggressive revenue projections to retail investors.