This study estimates the corporate tax savings from financial derivatives. I document a 3.6 and 4.4 percentage point reduction in three-year current and cash effective tax rates (ETRs), respectively, after a firm initiates a derivatives program. The decline in cash ETR equates to 10.69 million in tax savings for the average firm and 4.0 billion for the entire sample of 375 new derivatives users. Of these amounts, 8.75 million and 3.3 billion, respectively, are incremental to tax savings that theory suggests are a byproduct of risk management. Collectively, these findings provide economic insight into the prevalence of derivatives-based tax avoidance.

We evaluate whether, and under what circumstances, corporate tax aggressiveness influences audit pricing. Using a compound measure of two long-run effective tax rates, we find that tax-aggressive firms pay higher fees for external audit services after controlling for factors related to earnings management. The fee premium increases with management’s uncertainty about the sustainability of tax positions if audited by tax authorities (i.e., disclosed tax reserves). Further, the provision of auditor-provided tax services may create knowledge spillovers that alleviate the fee premium for tax aggressiveness, unless tax uncertainty is high. Finally, an accounting firm’s industry expertise in auditing is associated with higher audit fees independent of tax aggressiveness, whereas industry expertise in taxation leads to a fee premium only for tax-aggressive clients. Overall, the evidence implies firms’ aggressive tax behavior, tax services provider, and auditor expertise interact to influence the pricing of audit engagements.

ABSTRACT We examine how tax cuts that benefit some firms are related to the economic performance of their direct competitors. Consistent with tax cuts decreasing the cost of initiating competitive strategies, we find that a decrease in the tax burden for only a specific group of firms in the U.S. economy (i.e., “rivals”) has a negative economic effect on the performance of its direct competitors not directly exposed to the same tax cut (i.e., “competitors”). This negative externality is stronger when the relatively higher taxed competitors (1) are financially constrained, (2) operate in more competitive markets, (3) have similar products to their lower taxed rivals, (4) face rivals that retain more of their cash tax savings due to lower dividends and share repurchases, and (5) face lower taxed, but financially constrained, rivals. We also find that shareholders and lenders price the negative externality manifested in these competitors’ economic performance.

We investigate whether and how the complexity of derivatives influences analysts׳ earnings forecast properties. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that, relative to a matched control sample of non-users, analysts׳ earnings forecasts for new derivatives users are less accurate and more dispersed after derivatives initiation. These results do not appear to be driven by the economic complexity of derivatives, but rather the financial reporting of such economic complexity. Overall, despite their financial expertise, analysts routinely misjudge the earnings implications of firms׳ derivatives activity. However, we find evidence that a series of derivatives accounting standards has helped analysts improve their forecasts over time.

ABSTRACT This study provides the first large‐sample evidence on the economic tax effects of special purpose entities (SPEs). These increasingly common organizational structures facilitate corporate tax savings by enabling sponsor firms to increase tax‐advantaged activities and/or enhance their tax efficiency (i.e., relative tax savings of a given activity). Using path analysis, we find that SPEs facilitate greater tax avoidance such that an economically large amount of cash tax savings from research and development (R&D), depreciable assets, net operating loss carryforwards, intangible assets, foreign operations, and tax havens occur in conjunction with SPE use. We estimate that SPEs help generate over $330 billion of incremental cash tax savings, or roughly 6 percent of total U.S. federal corporate income tax collections during the sample period. Interaction analyses reveal that SPEs enhance the tax efficiency of intangibles and R&D by 61.5 percent to 87.5 percent. Overall, these findings provide economic insight into complex organizational structures supporting corporate tax avoidance.

ABSTRACT Subchapter C of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code levies an entity‐level tax on corporate profits, whereas Subchapter S allows corporations meeting specific criteria to elect out of this tax. Despite these differences, C and S corporations regularly compete for customers and capital. We examine whether and the extent to which competition from S corporations influences the future organizational form choice of rival C corporations and explore outcomes of this choice. Using data for 4,462 private U.S. commercial banks grouped by Metropolitan Statistical Area during 1997–2010, we find that greater competition from S corporation banks increases the likelihood that rival C corporation banks convert to Subchapter S status. We estimate that the aggregate first‐year tax savings from S conversion exceed $372 million. Consistent with these savings being used to maintain competitive parity with rivals, we find that converting banks increase their interest rates on customer deposits and advertising intensity. Our findings provide insight into whether competition from tax‐advantaged firms influences the organizational form choice of rival tax‐disadvantaged firms.

We examine shareholders' perceptions about how external tax advisors contribute to corporate tax planning. As residual claimants of corporate tax planning, shareholders benefit from lower corporate taxes, but also bear the financial and reputational costs of subsequent tax enforcement. Despite the influential advisory role of external tax advisors in corporate tax planning, existing research on how shareholders perceive this role is limited. Using event study methods and exploiting the heightened regulation of tax advice through the covered opinion rules as a setting, we observe average and cross‐sectional stock returns consistent with shareholders perceiving external tax advisors as contributing unfavorably to tax planning by promoting excessively risky strategies. We further find that risky and overall tax planning declined across firms after the enactment of the rules, consistent with shareholders' perceptions about tax advisors' contributions to firms' tax planning. Overall, our findings contribute to research on shareholder perceptions and valuation of tax planning, and have important implications for practice, where regulatory oversight of external tax advisors remains a significant concern.

Prior research shows that contingent liabilities do not accurately predict future cash payments due to the managerial discretion afforded by accounting standards. We examine the extent to which current accounting guidance for a material contingent liability—the reserve for unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) under Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48)—generates accruals that are predictive of future income tax cash outflows. We document that UTBs fully unwind as cash tax payments over the subsequent 5 years, suggesting that managers, on average, accurately incorporate their expectations of future tax liabilities. This result persists for firms that are (1) most affected by the implementation of FIN 48, (2) unable to impound detection risk into their reserves, (3) engaged in relatively more ex ante tax avoidance, (4) suspected to have engaged in earnings management through the tax accounts, and (5) subject to plausibly exogenous shocks to tax reporting. Overall, our results suggest that current accounting guidance under FIN 48 for contingent tax liabilities enables managers to accurately report, and financial statement users to reliably predict, future cash obligations.