Historically, a key advantage of being a public firm was broader access to capital, from a disperse group of shareholders. In recent years, such capital has increasingly become available to private firms as well. We document a dramatic increase over the past twenty years in the number of mutual funds participating in private markets and in the dollar value of these private firm investments. We evaluate several factors that potentially contribute to this trend: firms seeking extra capital to postpone public listing, mutual funds seeking higher risk-adjusted returns and initial public offering (IPO) allocations, and venture capitalists (VCs) seeking new investors to substantiate higher valuations. Results indicate that the first two factors play a significant role.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, we document that approximately 15% of venture capitalist (VC)‐backed firms raise additional capital from VCs in the five years after going public. We propose two explanations for why firms revert to VC financing post‐IPO (initial public offering). First, we hypothesize that VC participation in post‐IPO financing represents an efficient solution to informational problems that would otherwise constrain firms’ abilities to exploit value‐increasing investments. Analyses of firm and VC characteristics, together with the finding that these investments are value‐increasing for both VCs and the underlying companies, support this hypothesis. We find no support for the alternative that agency conflicts motivate these investments.

We analyze communications between the SEC and firms prior to IPOs using LDA analysis and KL divergence. The SEC’s concerns closely map onto the regulator’s stated mandate: companies increase prospectus disclosures on precise topics of SEC concern. Revenue recognition is the dominant topic of SEC concern, and it is not independently discovered by investors. Increased SEC concern about it is associated with greater secondary sales, lower post-IPO liquidity, lower post-IPO returns, and a higher probability of withdrawal. The regulator’s role during the capital raising process results in increased transparency but contributes to delays in the going public process.