Tighter bank lending standards could increase firms' post-hedging currency exposure by reducing firms' ability to fund hedging (funding channel) and/or by constraining counterparties' capacity to facilitate hedging (capacity channel). We find that tighter lending standards materially increase firms' exposure. In addition, we find no support for a funding-channel effect as firms' internal liquidity does not mitigate the impact of lending standards on exposure, indicating that the impact is through the capacity channel. Finally, we find a negative association between lending standards and aggregate transactions in currency derivatives, bolstering support for a capacity-channel effect. Our results have implications for firms' hedging policy and the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission.

We examine the impact of rivals’ competitive activities on firms’ quantity-of-capital constraints in 60 countries. Prior work shows that competition increases the costs of debt and equity, which reduce the economic profit from investment. Capital constraints, however, may prevent firms from exploiting all positive NPV projects. Using unique survey data and several econometric techniques, we address endogeneity problems that affect both capital constraints and rivals’ competitive activities. We find that rivals’ competitive activities are positively associated with firms’ capital constraints and are more strongly correlated with capital constraints than banking sector competition. We also show that quantity-of-capital constraints are negatively related to firm growth, incremental to the cost of capital.