This paper considers the nature of returns to scale in active management following Pástor et al. (2015) who fail to establish diseconomies of scale at the fund level. Using an enhanced empirical strategy, we find a significant negative impact of fund size on performance. This empirical evidence indicates that fund alpha and fund size are not independent entities. Consequently, skill, rather than being measured by the fund alpha, should be measured by the value that a fund extracts from capital markets. We also show that there exist sophisticated investors who correctly exploit positive net present value investment opportunities.

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.

We estimate the financial and real effects of a subsidy program on imported capital goods recently implemented in China. We identify firms that have access to the subsidy program by combining data on catalogues of eligible products periodically released by the government and product-level import data. Our findings demonstrate that following the implementation of the program, eligible firms experience an increase in borrowing and gain access to loans at lower interest rates compared to non-eligible firms. This improved financial situation enables them to expand their fixed-asset investments, increase total output, and enhance their export performance. The expansion of production capacity also leads to improved investment efficiency and greater profitability. Further analysis reveals that the effects of the policy are particularly pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and small firms in relatively competitive industries. This finding suggests that these firms face ex-ante financial constraints, and their marginal rate of return to capital is large.

Accounting misstatements are often detected with substantial delays, leading to “look-ahead bias” in model predictions if the detection lag is not considered. Moreover, the misstatement data-generating process is evolving due to regulatory regime shifts, further complicating the evaluation of model predictions. We design an approach that accounts for detection lags and continuously updates models to adapt to the changing data-generating process. By comparing with the conventional approach that ignores detection lags, we show that the look-ahead bias can substantially inflate prediction performance. We also demonstrate that although leaving a temporal gap between training and test samples can mitigate the look-ahead bias, it sacrifices the model’s predictive power by disconnecting the dynamic data-generating process between training and test periods. We further implement a trading strategy to evaluate the practical utility of the continuously updating approach. Our study presents a new conceptual lens for understanding and evaluating misstatement prediction models. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources identified in the study.

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.

We investigate the nexus between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firms' stock market liquidity. Using actual firm-level CSR expenditure data and a quasi-natural experiment setup of a mandated CSR regulation in India, we find that firms complying with the mandate experience significantly higher stock market liquidity, relative to non-CSR firms in the post-CSR mandate period. This effect seems to be more pronounced among CSR firms not affiliated to business groups, with concentrated promoter ownership, with low institutional ownership, with foreign sales and having operations in multiple locations. Further, we find that firms spending more on education and healthcare projects as part of their mandatory CSR engagement have higher stock market liquidity. Our results are in line with the conjecture that mandatory CSR regulation could lead to reduced information asymmetry and improved social and reputational capital, and thus improve the stock market liquidity of CSR firms. Finally, we show that mandated CSR firms, having superior stock market liquidity, obtain higher market valuations in the long run.

We examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness. We find that the presence of independent directors with industry experience on a firm’s audit committee significantly curtails firms’ earnings management. In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm’s compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence of such directors on the full board increases the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and improves acquirer returns from diversifying acquisitions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that having relevant industry expertise enhances independent directors’ ability to perform their monitoring function.