We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.

This paper examines the link between non-executive employee ownership and the terms and pricing of corporate loans. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in employee stock ownership is associated with 1.67% decrease in loan spreads and one fewer restrictive loan covenant. The negative effect of employee stock ownership on loan spreads remains significant when we use within-firm variation and perform an analysis with instrumental variables based on demographic characteristics to address the concerns of endogeneity. Further analysis reveals that employee stock ownership may affect loan spreads by improving corporate governance, curbing managerial risk-taking, reducing information asymmetry, and improving employee retention. In contrast, we find that employee ownership via stock options is associated with greater loan spreads, perhaps owing to their convex payoff structure. Overall, our results underscore the importance of the level and structure of employee ownership for pricing corporate loans.

This paper investigates whether joint ventures and strategic alliances create value for bondholders by examining the bond market’s reaction to announcements of these two types of cooperative business activities. Based on 2964 announcements from 1985 to 2011, we find that joint ventures and strategic alliances create significant value for bondholders. The average two-month abnormal bond return is 0.64% for joint ventures and 0.70% for strategic alliances. We find no evidence of a wealth transfer between the bondholders and stockholders. We further explore the determinants of bond value creation through hypotheses on the synergy effect, the alleviation of financial constraints, and real options. The results of our study show that financial synergy is a main driver of bondholder wealth effects in joint ventures, while operating synergy is a dominant factor in strategic alliances. We also find evidence to support the real option hypothesis for both events. Finally, we show that the structure of bond contracts plays an important role in the link between synergy and abnormal bond returns.

Our study examines how the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) across US state courts affects the relationship between leverage and CEO compensation. We find that the IDD adoption significantly attenuates the typically positive association between leverage and CEO pay. This effect is more pronounced for CEOs with higher ex-ante mobility, greater career concerns, weaker organizational influence, and higher firm-specific skills. Rejecting the IDD, on the other hand, amplifies the positive relationship between leverage and CEO pay. Our findings underscore the influence of labor market dynamics on CEO compensation.