In addition to being a function of traditional fundamentals such as cash-flow persistence and the discount rate, the equilibrium association between a security price and a value-relevant statistic can simply be a function of what rational investors believe the association will be. We refer to this phenomenon as beliefs-driven price association (BPA). By explicitly considering the phenomenon of BPA, we show that the price response to information releases can vary over time even if the risk-free interest rate and investor preferences are static and the earnings/cash flow generating process is stable. This observation suggests, for example, that price-to-earnings associations and price volatility can vary over time even if a stable pattern of economic fundamentals suggests otherwise. The possibility of BPA suggests that measures of the cost of capital, information content, and growth prospects inferred from observed market prices will be confounded. While we do not predict when periods of BPA will arise, we provide empirically testable predictions about how prices should behave during periods of BPA. In particular, we predict that, during sufficiently long periods of high (positive or negative) BPA, price volatility, price levels, and expected returns will be higher than would be implied by a fundamental valuation framework. Finally, while BPA in the pricing of one security does not cause BPA in the pricing of other securities, the price levels of those other securities will be affected if the securities with BPA are sufficiently large relative to the market as a whole.

This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms that can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free‐rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this tradeoff, an institutional commitment to uniformity is socially desirable when firms are sufficiently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to society are large. We show that the regulatory intensity for a given firm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard‐setting institutions and their effects on corporate governance and lobbying efforts.

This article shows that improving financial efficiency may reduce real efficiency. While the former depends on the total amount of information available, the latter depends on the relative amounts of hard and soft information. Disclosing more hard information (e.g., earnings) increases total information, raising financial efficiency and reducing the cost of capital. However, it induces the manager to prioritize hard information over soft by cutting intangible investment to boost earnings, lowering real efficiency. The optimal level of financial efficiency is non-monotonic in investment opportunities. Even if low financial efficiency is desirable to induce investment, the manager may be unable to commit to it. Optimal government policy may involve upper, not lower, bounds on financial efficiency.

This paper complements the ongoing empirical discussion surrounding participative budgeting by comparing its economic merits relative to a top-down budgeting alternative. In both budgeting regimes, private information is communicated vertically between a principal and a manager. We show that top-down budgeting incurs fewer agency costs than bottom-up budgeting whenever the level of information asymmetry is relatively low. Although the choice between top-down and bottom-up budgeting ultimately determines who receives private information within the firm, we find that both the principal and manager's preferences over the allocation of private information remain qualitatively similar across the two budgeting paradigms. Specifically, while the principal always prefers either minimal or maximal private information, the manager prefers an interim or maximal level of private information regardless of who is privately informed. Last, we use our model to address empirical inconsistencies relating the firm's choice of budgeting process, the resulting budgetary slack, and performance.

Standard Bayesians’ beliefs converge when they receive the same piece of new information. However, when agents initially disagree and have uncertainty about the precision of a signal, their disagreement might instead increase, despite receiving the same information. We demonstrate that this divergence of beliefs leads to a unimodal effect of the absolute surprise in the signal on trading volume. We show that this prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence using trading volume around earnings announcements of U.S. firms. We find evidence of elevated volume following moderate surprises and depressed volume following more extreme surprises, a pattern that is more pronounced when investors hold more distant prior beliefs and are more uncertain about earnings’ precision. The evidence is consistent with the model where investors disagree about stocks’ expected returns and do not know the precision of earnings as a signal about the firm’s value.

We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer‐harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group.

While researchers and practitioners alike estimate firms' exposures to systematic risk factors, the disclosure literature typically assumes that exposures are common knowledge. We develop a model where the firm's exposure to a factor is unknown, and analyze the effects of factor-exposure uncertainty on share price and the effects of disclosure about the exposure. We find that: (1) factor-exposure uncertainty introduces skewness and excess kurtosis in the cash flow distribution relative to the commonly used normal distribution; (2) risk-factor disclosure affects all moments of that distribution; and (3) the pricing of higher moments affects the price response of disclosure and the incentives to disclose. For example, factor-exposure uncertainty may actually increase price when the uncertainty implies positive skewness in the cash flow distribution. Hence, a reduction in uncertainty through disclosure may increase cost of capital. We also extend our model to multiple firms and show that factor-exposure uncertainty manifests as uncertainty about a firm's CAPM beta.