In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the U.S. government passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act on March 27, 2020, creating the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), among others, to aid small businesses and their employees. Most PPP loans were administered by commercial banks in return for fees, and the banks bore little monitoring costs or risks, since PPP loans were forgivable by the government. I analyze if PPP loans of up to 1 million were net substitutes or complements for conventional small business loans of the same size for the PPP-issuing banks. The 1 million upper bound roughly corresponds to credits to the smallest firms that are often financially constrained. Using Call Report data through 2020:Q4, I find significant net complementarities. An additional dollar of PPP credit of up to $1 million had multiplier effects on conventional loans to the smallest firms of about an extra dollar.

The role of bank regulation and supervision (RS) on financial stability and welfare has been subject to ongoing research, especially since the Great Recession. RS is expected to help eliminate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that are abundant in financial transactions. In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model that is augmented by either a bank regulatory and supervisory agent who chooses the level of RS by maximizing bank profits, or by a macroprudential agent who minimizes non-performing loans (NPL). We compare the long-term outcomes of these scenarios and show that minimizing NPL is feasible for a larger and economically more viable range of parameter values than the alternatives. Moreover, for a comparable set of parameter combinations, the optimal choice of RS that minimizes NPL leads to both higher levels of steady state income and lower interest spreads as compared to RS that maximizes bank profits.

We address whether politics played important roles in allocating Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) bailout funds, and whether PPP allocations effectively bailed out small businesses vs. banks. Our econometric evidence suggests that politicians/other government agents at national and local levels effectively steered PPP funds toward small businesses and banks based on their locations to try to influence election outcomes. We also uncover evidence that some PPP funds were effectively allocated by lobbying efforts of certain banks. Findings are confirmed by a novel mediation analysis and numerous robustness checks. We also find banks profited from PPP through multiple channels, adding to extant findings, and suggesting that PPP may have effectively bailed out banks as well as small businesses, but through different political influences.