We examine whether initial public offering (IPO) registration disclosures expose firms to greater nonshareholder litigation risk. Using hand-collected data on lawsuits initiated at federal and state courts against IPO firms, we show that firms that submit their IPO registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission publicly experience a 16 percent increase in litigation risk between the registration filing and issuance date. Consistent with the public filing of the registration driving this heightened litigation risk, firms that file their registration confidentially under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act do not experience such an increase in litigation risk. The effects of confidential filing are concentrated among business-initiated lawsuits, intellectual property/contract lawsuits, and potentially meritless lawsuits. We find no disproportionate increase in lawsuits after an IPO for confidential filers, suggesting that withholding information during the IPO registration period mitigates litigation risk.

This paper develops a multi-firm equilibrium model of information acquisition based on differences in firms’ characteristics. The model shows that heightened economic uncertainty amplifies stock price reactions to earnings announcements via increased investor attention, which varies by firm characteristics. Firms with higher systematic risk or more informative announcements attract more attention and exhibit stronger reactions to earnings announcements. Moreover, heightened investor attention caused by high economic uncertainty leads to a steeper CAPM relation and higher betas for announcing firms. Empirical analyses using firm-level attention measures and CAPM tests on high- versus low-attention days support the model’s predictions.