We examine effects of government actions and related accounting policies on the corporate bond market implied by changes in relations between aggregate bond returns and cash flow and discount rate news. We capture the influence of risk by partitioning bonds into investment and speculative grades. We use earnings changes as a proxy for cash flow news and T-Bill rate changes as a proxy for discount rate news. As expected, during non-crisis periods, we observe a positive relation between earnings changes and bond returns and a negative relation for T-Bill rate changes. A combination of government bailouts of large financial institutions and mark-to-market accounting preserves the positive relation for earnings changes during the crisis for investment grade bonds, while absence of these factors leads to an insignificant relation for speculative grade. Intervention by the Federal Reserve to induce lower interest rates as earnings were declining, a flight to safety shifting demand from corporate bonds to T-Bills, and low cost funds invested in risk free investments explain a reversal of the relation between bond returns and T-Bill rate changes for both grades.

We find widespread evidence that firms avoid overtime payments by strategically assigning “managerial” titles. Exploiting the exemption threshold under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find managerial titles increase almost fivefold just above the overtime pay cutoff, including suspect listings, such as “Director of First Impressions” for a role equivalent to “Front-Desk Clerk.” Avoidance is higher when firms have more bargaining power and are financially constrained. It is also more common in occupations with volatile demand and unpredictable worker scheduling. Patterns align with litigation and Department of Labor enforcement. Firms avoid roughly 13.5% in compensation costs, hiring strategic “managers.”

We examine the relation between workplace safety and managers’ attempts to meet earnings expectations. Using establishment-level data on workplace safety from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, we document significantly higher injury/illness rates in firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts compared to firms that miss or comfortably beat analyst forecasts. The higher injury/illness rates in firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts are associated with both increases in employee workloads and in abnormal reductions of discretionary expenses. The relation between benchmark beating and workplace safety is stronger when there is less union presence, when workers’ compensation premiums are less sensitive to injury claims, and among firms with less government business. Our findings highlight a specific consequence of managers’ attempts to meet earnings expectations through real activities management.

To extend and monitor loans, banks collect detailed and proprietary information about the financial prospects of their customers, many of whom are local businesses and households. Therefore, banks’ loan portfolios contain potentially useful information about local economic conditions. We investigate the association between information in loan portfolios and local economic conditions. Using a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 1990:Q1 to 2013:Q4, we document that information in loan portfolios aggregated to the state level is associated with current and future changes in statewide economic conditions. Furthermore, the provision for loan and lease losses contains information incremental to leading indicators of state‐level economic activity and recessions. Loan portfolio information also helps to improve predictions of economic conditions at more granular levels, such as at the commuting zone level. We discuss the relevance of these findings for economic analysis and forecasting, and the relation of our study to prior work on the informativeness of accounting information about the macroeconomy.

This study sheds light on the extent to which the use of operating leases depends on reporting incentives, such as understating liabilities, and non-reporting incentives that partly arise from the overlap between accounting, bankruptcy, and tax laws, such as increasing financing capacity and flexibility. We provide evidence that expanding financing capacity, accommodating volatile operations, and maximizing the present value of tax deductions are all important drivers of leasing decisions. Our findings suggest that capital markets and contracting-based reporting incentives have little influence on operating lease use. In particular, we find weak evidence that firms increase operating leases in advance of issuing equity, and no evidence that firms use operating leases to window-dress in advance of issuing debt, to avoid debt covenant violations, for compensation purposes, or to paint a better picture on an ongoing basis. These findings are consistent with reporting incentives playing a second-order role in leasing decisions.

We empirically examine the joint predictions of the pecking order theory and the theory of time-varying asymmetric information regarding the timing of security offerings around information disclosures. We analyze loan originations and bond offerings around earnings announcements and compare them against equity offerings. In support of the theories' predictions, we find a positive association between the information sensitivity of securities and the likelihood of their issuance after earnings announcements. In particular, we find that clustering after earnings announcements is weakest in loan originations, stronger in bond offerings, and strongest in equity offerings. Also consistent with the theories, we find that the size of news in earnings announcements matters in the timing decision. We find weak evidence regarding the theories' implication that the direction of news in the announcement plays a role in the timing decision. We test and find that this latter result is partly attributable to potential costs associated with the omission of material negative information, such as litigation risk.

We examine whether initial public offering (IPO) registration disclosures expose firms to greater nonshareholder litigation risk. Using hand-collected data on lawsuits initiated at federal and state courts against IPO firms, we show that firms that submit their IPO registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission publicly experience a 16 percent increase in litigation risk between the registration filing and issuance date. Consistent with the public filing of the registration driving this heightened litigation risk, firms that file their registration confidentially under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act do not experience such an increase in litigation risk. The effects of confidential filing are concentrated among business-initiated lawsuits, intellectual property/contract lawsuits, and potentially meritless lawsuits. We find no disproportionate increase in lawsuits after an IPO for confidential filers, suggesting that withholding information during the IPO registration period mitigates litigation risk.

While the production of credit ratings has long been limited mainly to rating agencies (CRAs), recent years have seen the growing popularity of consensus credit ratings crowdsourced from banks (i.e., bank ratings). We provide the first comprehensive examination of the properties and informativeness of bank ratings relative to CRA ratings. We find that bank ratings often deviate from CRA ratings, with over 60% of firm-months having different bank and CRA ratings. These deviations contain useful information. Bank ratings improve out-of-sample prediction of defaults and CRA rating revisions and explain the cross-section of credit spreads. However, bank ratings do not improve out-of-sample prediction of credit excess returns, indicating that current prices incorporate bank rating information. Overall our findings suggest that bank ratings are a useful supplement to traditional credit ratings.

We examine the role of the coupon choice in bond contracts as a signaling mechanism in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the credit quality of the borrower. Prior literature focuses on the use of maturity as a signaling mechanism. We conjecture that the coupon is a more effective signaling mechanism. We exploit the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry, and employ both bond- and equity market-based variables of information asymmetry to test our conjecture. We find that following the enactment of RegFD, the coupon rates of bonds issued by unrated firms increase relatively more than those of rated firms, consistent with the coupon choice addressing information asymmetry. We fail to find similar increases in maturity. Our inferences remain the same when using the probability of informed trade to measure relative changes in information asymmetry around the enactment of RegFD. We also draw similar conclusions utilizing exogenous drops in analyst coverage that result from brokerage house closures as an alternative quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we provide evidence that the coupon is used more extensively when issuance costs are higher, precisely when maturity is predicted to be a less efficient contract term with which to address information asymmetry.