Theory predicts that capping brokers’ compensation exacerbates the exploitation of retail investors. We show that regulated caps on mutual fund 12b-1 fees, effectively sales commissions, are associated with negative equity fund performance, but only after a structural shift toward maximum permitted levels of the fees around 2000. Past this break point, flow–performance sensitivity shifts from the middle- to the highest-performing funds, suggesting that the fee cap increases performance-chasing behavior by constraining brokers’ incentives to learn about lower-ranked funds. The policy implication is that regulators must reevaluate the efficacy of caps on brokerage fees.

This paper examines the nature of information asymmetry between foreign and local investors on the Helsinki stock exchange (HEX) for the period 1999–2004. We take into account the differences in informational characteristics by partitioning stocks into single-listed, cross-listed and internationally well-known stock categories, after which we compare foreign and local investors’ performance and trading advantages. Local investors have trading advantages in the short term in all stock categories. However, such local advantages diminish for Nokia, the only internationally well-known stock on HEX.