We investigate whether firms use stock repurchases to meet or beat analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. We identify conditions under which repurchases increase EPS and document the frequency of accretive repurchases from 1988 to 2001. We find a disproportionately large number of accretive stock repurchases among firms that would have missed analysts’ forecasts without the repurchase. The repurchase-induced component of earnings surprises appears to be discounted by the market, and this discount is larger when the repurchase seems motivated by EPS management, although using the repurchase to avoid missing analyst forecasts appears to mitigate some of the negative stock price response.

We examine how informed trading activities affect the market reaction to accounting restatements. We find significantly less negative reactions to accounting restatements when managers are net purchasers of stock before the restatement, and significantly more negative market reactions when managers are net sellers. Similar patterns characterize corporate trading, where prior stock repurchases dampen negative reactions and prior equity issuances increase negative reactions to the restatement. We address the possibility of reverse causality in which informed trades are undertaken because of the expected market reaction by examining the difference between disclosed and non-disclosed trades, finding that the market reaction is concentrated in the disclosed trades. Our results are incremental to general return patterns associated with insider trading and corporate equity transactions, and hold after controlling for other determinants of the market reaction to restatements. Taken together, these findings suggest that investors use informed trading activities to help interpret and price accounting restatements. JEL Classifications: M41, M42. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the study.

We predict and find that accounting restatements that adversely affect shareholder wealth at the restating firm also induce share price declines among non-restating firms in the same industry. These share price declines are unrelated to changes in analysts' earnings forecasts, but instead seem to reflect investors' accounting quality concerns. Peer firms with high industry-adjusted accruals experience a more pronounced share price decline than do low-accrual firms. This accounting contagion effect is concentrated among revenue restatements by relatively large firms in the industry. We also find that investors impose a larger penalty on the stock prices of peer firms with high earnings and high accruals when peer and restating firms use the same external auditor. Our results are consistent with the notion that some accounting restatements cause investors to reassess the financial statement information previously released by non-restating firms.

We examine the effect of disclosure requirements on managers' stock repurchase decisions. In 2003, the SEC amended Rule 10b-18, significantly increasing the disclosure requirements for and transparency of stock repurchases for all issuers. While stock repurchases are often used by firms to efficiently return capital to shareholders, they can also be used opportunistically to increase earnings per share. We find that the 2003 SEC amendment enables investors to detect and discount opportunistic repurchases, curtails the extent to which firms use opportunistic repurchases, and reduces or eliminates the negative real effects stemming from opportunistic repurchases (reduced employment, reduced capital expenditures, and reduced R&D expenditures). Our evidence suggests that disclosures aimed at increasing the transparency of firms’ activities can significantly reduce the extent to which firms use these activities opportunistically to manage earnings, thereby reducing the accompanying real consequences of opportunistic behavior.