Using cash flows from a large sample of buyout and venture funds, I show that private equity (PE) distributions predict returns in the industries of funds’ specialization. My tests distinguish timing skill from reactions to market conditions and spillover effects of PE activity. Fund managers foresee comparable public firms’ earnings but sell at the industry peaks only if they have performance fees to harvest. These results have implications for manager selection and improve our understanding of PE fund returns and the role of PE in capital markets.

We propose a simple and intuitive measure of the annualized excess return of investments in private equity (PE) funds, as well as in similar vehicles that hold hard-to-values assets. Our ‘Direct Alpha’ method is well-founded in theory and dominates the existing approaches to convert fund lifetime returns into inputs amenable for portfolio-wide optimization. Existing Public Market Equivalent (PME) approaches are either heuristic or involve significant approximation errors. Using real-world PE fund cash flow data, we juxtapose Direct Alpha against nearly all PME methods that have been in broad use.

Hedge fund activism is associated with improvements in the governance and performance of targeted firms. In this article, we show that these positive effects of activism reach beyond the targets, as nontargeted peers make similar improvements under the threat of activism. Peers with higher threat perception, as measured by director connections to past targets, are more likely to increase leverage and payout, decrease capital expenditures and cash, and improve return on assets and asset turnover. As a result, their valuations improve, and their probability of being targeted declines. Our results are not explained by time-varying industry conditions or competition effects whereby improved targets force their product market rivals to become more competitive.

We examine the ability of ratings and market-based measures to predict defaults. Although market-based measures are more accurate at horizons up to one year, ratings complement market-based measures and are not redundant in predicting defaults across horizons. Market-based measures differ from ratings in that they respond to both cash-flow and discount-rate news, while ratings respond primarily to cash-flow news, which is more informative of future defaults. Ratings ignore transitory shocks to credit risk, while market-based measures do not. Rating agencies respond to transitory shocks with watches rather than downgrades. Ratings are more informative during expansions and for speculative grade firms.

We estimate unsmoothed private equity net asset values (NAVs) at weekly frequency for individual funds. Using simulations and large samples of buyout and venture funds, we show that our method yields superior estimates of NAVs relative to simple approaches based on extrapolation of reported NAVs. The market beta of an average buyout (venture) fund is around 1.0 (1.4), and the total risk is 33% (40%) per year. The risk-return profile of the funds varies significantly over time and across funds. Risk-taking and reporting quality appear to persist by manager.

Private equity funds hold assets that are hard to value. Managers have incentives to distort reported valuations if these reports are used by investors to decide on commitments to subsequent funds. Using a large dataset of buyout and venture funds, we test for the presence of return manipulations. We find that some underperforming managers inflate reported returns during fundraising. However, those managers are less likely to raise a next fund, suggesting that investors can see through the manipulation. In contrast, top-performing funds appear to understate valuations. A simple theoretical framework rationalizes our empirical results as well as those of related papers.

We propose and test a framework of private information acquisition and decision timing for asset allocators hiring outside investment managers. Using unique data on due diligence interactions between an institutional allocator and 860 hedge fund managers, we find that the production of private information complements public information. The allocator strategically chooses how much proprietary information to collect, reducing due diligence time by 18 months and improving outcomes. Funds selected by the manager outperform those not selected by 9% over 20 months. The outperformance relates to the allocator learning about fund return-to-scale constraints and manager skill before other investors.