"Analyzing the location choices of the post-1964 U.S. immigrants results in three main findings: (1) these immigrants are more geographically concentrated than natives of the same age and ethnicity and reside in cities with large ethnic populations; (2) education plays a key role in location choice, reducing geographic concentration and the likelihood of being in cities with a high concentration of fellow countrymen and increasing the probability of changing locations after arrival in the United States; (3) internal migration within the United States occurs more frequently among immigrants than natives and facilitates the process of assimilation for the more educated individuals."

This paper examines rational expectations in the Treasury bill market from 1961 to 1988 with a risk premium specified to be proportional to the volatility of excess returns using instrumental variables. From 1961 to 1972 and from 1972 to 1979, rational expectations cannot be rejected, and both the predictive power of the yield curve and the risk premium are highly significant. By contrast, with just a constant risk premium and with a risk premium proxied by moving averages of absolute interest rate changes, rational expectations are rejected for each subperiod, and the yield curve has significant predictive information only from 1972 to 1979.

No one has derived closed-form solutions for consumption with stochastic labor income and constant relative risk aversion utility. A numerical technique is used here to give an accurate approximation to the solution. The resulting consumption function is often dramatically different than the certainty equivalence solution typically used, in which consumption is proportional to the sum of financial wealth and the present value of expected future income. The results help explain three important empirical consumption puzzles: excess sensitivity of consumption to transitory income, high growth of consumption in the presence of a low risk-free interest rate, and underspending of the elderly.

We hypothesize that a mandated accounting change (MAC) that disallows the deferral of revenues or capitalization of expenditures causes the aggregate deferred revenue and capitalized expenditure flows to fall below their levels prior to the change. In addition, the deferred revenue or capitalized expenditure flows after a MAC will exceed the pre‐MAC levels that would have resulted from formerly capitalizing or deferring these items. We discuss using deferred tax flows as a proxy for a firm's level of capitalization and deferral. Finally, we test our hypothesis by examining changes in deferred tax flows for a sample of firms that capitalized research and development costs prior to the promulgation of FAS2. The test results indicate that managers actively restored revenue flows and capitalized expenditures for the period immediately following FAS2. Second, smaller firms appear to be more active in this restoration process than larger firms. Finally, the decline in the rate of growth of depreciation for capitalizing firms suggests that managers may have influenced the capitalization of costs to restore earnings to pre‐FAS2 levels. Résumé. Les auteurs posent l'hypothèse selon laquelle une modification comptable non discrétionnaire (MCND) par suite de l'interdiction du report de produits ou de la capitalisation de dépenses fait en sorte que les flux globaux des produits reportés et des dépenses capitalisées diminuent au‐dessous des niveaux qu'ils affichaient avant la modification. En outre, les flux de produits reportés ou de dépenses capitalisées après une MCND excéderont les niveaux qui auraient résulté de la capitalisation ou du report de ces éléments avant la MCND. Les auteurs traitent de l'utilisation des flux d'impôt reporté d'une entreprise à litre de substitut du niveau de capitalisation et de report. Enfin, ils vérifient leur hypothèse en examinant les changements des flux d'impôt reporté pour un échantillon d'entreprises qui ont capitalisé leurs frais de recherche et de développement avant la promulgation par le FASB de la Norme n o 2. Les résultats du test indiquent que les gestionnaires ont activement rétabli les flux de produits reportés et de dépenses capitalisées pendant la période suivant immédiatement la Norme n o 2. Deuxièmement, les entreprises plus petites semblent plus enclines à opérer ce processus de rétablissement que les entreprises plus grandes. Enfin, le déclin du taux de croissance de l'amortissement pour les entreprises qui recourent à la capitalisation donne à penser que les gestionnaires peuvent avoir joué sur la capitalisation des coûts pour ramener les bénéfices à leurs niveaux antérieurs à la Norme n o 2.

Stock pride change associated with a given unexpected earnings change (the earnings response coefficient) exhibits cross-sectional and temporal variation. We predict and document evidence that the earnings response coefficient is a function of riskless interest rates and the riskiness, growth and/or persistence of earnings. The earnings response coefficient also varies cross-sectionally with the holding period return interval. Collectively, our results explain the previously reported differential earnings response coefficient with respect to size. Moreover, by including the factors noted above, the empirical specification of the earnings/returns relation is significantly improved.

A majority of corporate zero-coupon bonds includes a call provision, giving the firm the right to call the bond at par value. In this paper, we investigate whether or not it is optimal for the firm to call such a bond for refunding purposes, taking into consideration the effect of corporate taxes. We find that it is not optimal to refund the bond as long as the corporate tax rate is less than 50 percent. We find that a significantly higher proportion of callable zero-coupon bonds, compared to noncallables, has restrictive financing covenants, suggesting that the call feature is included to provide flexibility at a low cost for future recapitalizations as the firm's investment opportunities change.

Reviews the book "Meeting the Technology Challenge: Cost Accounting in a JIT Environment," by C.J. McNair, William Mosconi and Thomas Norris.

[We present a model of corporate acquisitions in which initially uninformed bidders must incur costs to learn their (independent) valuations of a potential takeover target. The first bidder makes either a preemptive bid that will deter the second bidder from investigating or a lower bid that will induce the second bidder to investigate and possibly compete. We show that the expected price of the target may be higher when the first bidder makes a deterring bid than when there is competitive bidding. Hence, by weakening the first bidder's incentive to choose a preemptive bid, regulatory and management policies to assist competing bidders may reduce both the expected takeover price and social welfare.]

[Technical analysis, or the use of past prices to infer private information, has value in a model in which prices are not fully revealing and traders have rational conjectures about the relation between prices and signals. A two-period dynamic model of equilibrium is used to demonstrate that rational investors use historical prices in forming their demands and to illustrate the sensitivity of the value of technical analysis to changes in the values of the exogenous parameters.]