Much of the male-female wage differential exists because men and women are assigned to different jobs. Within narrow job categories, there is no male-female differential. Only a tortured taste theory of discrimination can reconcile these facts. We argue that differential movement along job ladders entails comparative advantage, so the ability standard for promotion is higher for women. This implies that more able women will be passed over in favor of less able men. Women, assumed to have the same ability distribution as men, earn less. The differential reflects females' lower promotion probability, not within-job discrimination.

European countries have enacted various job security provisions over the last 30 years. Employers are required to pay workers on separation or to give advance notice of termination. In anything less than a perfectly functioning market, there are effects of the provisions on employment. Incumbents are more likely to retain their jobs, but new workers are less likely to be hired. An examination of the European data suggests that severance pay requirements reduce employment.

This study develops and tests the hypothesis that the quality and quantity of municipal financial information are positively associated with increased competition in the primary market for new issues of general obligation bonds. A measure of market competition, the number of underwriter bids tendered, is regressed on several market‐related and issue‐specific control variables and a group of financial reporting test variables. A sample of 224 new issues of municipal general obligation bonds sold by competitive bid between 1978 and 1983 is examined. The results generally support the hypothesis. Employment of an independent CPA firm auditor and more extensive disclosure increase competition, as expected. However, no support was found for the argument that holding a Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance increases the level of underwriter competition. Résumé. Les auteurs établissent et vérifient l'hypothèse selon laquelle la qualité et la quantité d'information financière municipale sont en relation positive avec l'augmentation de la concurrence sur le marché primaire pour les nouvelles émissions d'obligations générales. Une mesure de la concurrence sur le marché, soit le nombre d'offres de preneurs ferme, est soumise à une analyse de régression basée sur plusieurs variables de contrôle reliées au marché et particulières à l'émission et sur un groupe de variables‐tests reliées à l'information financière. Les auteurs examinent un échantillon de 224 nouvelles émissions d'obligations municipales générales vendues par soumission concurrentielle entre 1978 et 1983. Les résultats obtenus corroborent de façon générale l'hypothèse posée. Le recours à un vérificateur d'un cabinet de CPA indépendant et la publication d'informations plus étendues accentuent la concurrence, comme prévu. Cependant, rien ne confirme l'hypothèse selon laquelle la détention d'un Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance intensifie le degré de concurrence chez les preneurs ferme.

risk ; probability ; consumers ; information

The results of forecasting experiments based on an error correction mechanism (ECM) model and various types of vector autoregressive (VAR) and Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) models are presented. A Bayesian error correction mechanism (BECM) model is also tested. This model represents a hybrid of the BVAR and ECM models. The results from experiments using fifty industries and monthly Ohio labor market data demonstrate that the ECM model produces forecasts with much lower errors than any of the alternative VAR or BVAR models when the variables used in the model pass the statistical tests for cointegration. The findings confirm many of the beliefs expressed by Granger (1986) and Engle and Yoo (1987) based on theoretical consideration of the ECM model versus the VAR model. A result contradictory to the contentions of Engle and Yoo is that the BECM model performs well at the longer forecast horizons for both cointegrated and non-cointegrated industries.

[The role of the medium of exchange in competition among bidders and its effect on returns to stockholders in corporate takeovers are investigated. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, our model shows that stockholders of both acquiring and target firms obtain higher returns when a takeover is financed with cash rather than equity, and that returns to target shareholders increase with competition. The model predicts that the fraction of synergy captured by the target decreases with the level of synergy. Finally, it is shown that, as competition increases, the cash component of the offer as well as the proportion of cash offered increases.]