This paper introduces two methods of hiding loan losses and analyzes how they affect a bank's loan interest income, payments on deposits, liquidity and moral hazard. The analysis reveals that a hiding method represents a Ponzi scheme. Contrary to classic theory, e.g. Diamond (1984), moral hazard may arise even though a bank's loan portfolio is diversified. Alternative instruments to eliminate hiding are investigated. Under specific circumstances, a Ponzi scheme may provide a socially optimal method to create liquidity and prevent a failure of a solvent but illiquid bank.

This paper examines blanket guarantee, deposit insurance and restructuring decisions with respect to a multinational bank (MNB) using Nash bargaining when the threat of a bank panic motivates countries to make decisions quickly. Failure of the bank would unevenly distribute externalities across countries, influencing the restructuring incentives. In equilibrium, the bank is either liquidated or one of the countries – or both – recapitalizes it. A partition of the recapitalization costs is sensitive to the country-specific benefits and costs from recapitalization, panic and liquidation. The home regulator benefits from the advantage that it is the only entity that can legally liquidate the MNB. Rational expectations regarding the bargaining result affect the incentives to declare a blanket guarantee.

[This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor countrylevel investor protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when creditor protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak creditor protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor protections and facilitate access to external finance.]

We analyze a sample of over 3,600 ex ante explicit severance pay agreements in place at 808 firms and show that firms set ex ante explicit severance pay agreements as one component in managing the optimal level of equity incentives. Younger executives are more likely to receive explicit contracts and better terms. Firms with high distress risk, high takeover probability, and high return volatility are significantly more likely to enter into new or revised severance contracts. Finally, ex post payouts to managers are largely determined by the ex ante contract terms.

ABSTRACT We study determinants of internal control reporting decisions under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX 404) using a sample of restating firms whose original misstatements are linked to underlying control weaknesses. We find that only a minority of these firms acknowledge their existing control weaknesses during their misstatement periods, and that this proportion has declined over time. Further, the probability of reporting existing weaknesses is negatively associated with external capital needs, firm size, non‐audit fees, and the presence of a large audit firm; it is positively associated with financial distress, auditor effort, previously reported control weaknesses and restatements, and recent auditor and management changes. These results provide evidence that detection and disclosure incentives play a role in whether existing material weaknesses are reported, which has implications for the effectiveness of SOX 404 in providing investors with advance warning of potential accounting problems.

[Recent cases of hedge fund fraud have caused large losses for investors and have fueled the debate regarding the ability of regulators to oversee the industry. This article proposes a set of performance flags, based on suspicious patterns in returns, as indicators of a heightened risk of fraud. We collect a sample of hedge funds charged with legal or regulatory violations and find that funds charged with misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or Ponzi schemes trigger the performance flags at a higher frequency than other funds.]

In the context of a “beauty-contest” coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and from the average action), players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals. Each signal has an underlying accuracy (how precisely it identifies the state) and a clarity (how easy it is to understand). The unique linear equilibrium has interesting properties: the signals which receive attention are the clearest available, even if they have poor underlying accuracy; the number of signals observed falls as the complementarity of players' actions rises; and, if actions are more complementary, the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium is more public in nature. The consequences of “rational-inattention” constraints on information transmission and processing are also studied.

This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when creditor protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak creditor protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor protections and facilitate access to external finance.