Auditing, Audit Fees, Audit-pricing, Legal liability

Abstract. Issues surrounding the allocation of sunk capacity costs to products are among the oldest in managerial accounting. On the one hand, such costs are generally deemed to be irrelevant, but on the other hand, actual accounting systems commonly make these allocations. This paper examines a decision maker who incurs costs to acquire capacity and then uses an opportunity cost to allocate that capacity among a sequence of product proposals. Under specified circumstances, the sunk cost of capacity is shown to approximate the optimal opportunity cost of capacity. As the number of product proposals grows, the expected opportunity loss from using a simple sunk cost based capacity allocation rule goes to zero. The model is extended to consider different types of products and a multiperiod setting. Résumé. Les questions qui entourent la répartition des coûts irrécupérables relatifs à la capacité entre les différents produits comptent parmi les plus vieux problèmes en comptabilité de gestion. D'une part, ces coûts sont généralement réputés n'être pas pertinents, tandis que d'autre part, en réalité, les systèmes de comptabilité assurent couramment ces répartitions. Les auteurs examinent le cas d'un décideur qui engage des frais pour acquérir une certaine capacité et utilise ensuite un coût d'option pour répartir cette capacité entre une série de projets de fabrication de produits. Dans des circonstances données, les auteurs démontrent que les coûts irrécupérables de la capacité acquise se rapprochent du coût d'option optimal de cette capacité. À mesure que croît le nombre de projets de fabrication de produits, la perte d'option prévue, si l'on utilise une règle de répartition simple de la capacité fondée sur les coûts irrécupérables, se rapproche de zéro. Le modèle est élargi de façon à englober différents types de produits et plusieurs périodes.

Three major motives have been suggested for takeovers: synergy, agency, and hubris. Existing empirical evidence is unable to clearly distinguish among these motives probably due to the simultaneous existence of all three in any sample of takeovers. This paper suggests a way of distinguishing among these competing hypotheses by looking at the correlation between target and total gains. It is argued that this correlation should be positive if synergy is the motive, negative if agency is the motive, and zero if hubris is the motive. The empirical results show that synergy is the primary motive in takeovers with positive total gains even though the evidence is consistent with the simultaneous existence of hubris in this sample. It is also found that agency is the primary motive in takeovers with negative total gains.

Han’s maximum rank correlation (MRC) estimator is shown to be√ n-consistent and asymptotically normal. The proof rests on a general method for determining the asymptotic distribution of a maximization estimator, a simple U-statistic decomposition, and a uniform bound for degenerate U-processes. A consistent estimator of the asymptotic covari-ance matrix is provided, along with a result giving the explicit form of this matrix for any model within the scope of the MRC estimator. The latter result is applied to the binary choice model, and it is found that the MRC estimator does not achieve the semiparametric efficiency bound.

According to human capital theory, technological change will influence the retirement decisions of older workers in two ways. First, workers in industries with high rates of technological change will retire later if there is a net positive correlation between technological change and on-the-job training. Second, an unexpected change in the rate of technological change will induce older workers to retire sooner because the required amount of retraining will be an unattractive investment. We matched industry data on productivity growth and occupational data on required training with data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Older Men to test these hypotheses. Our results support both hypotheses.

P. V. Viswanath, Strategic Considerations, the Pecking Order Hypothesis, and Market Reactions to Equity Financing, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 213-234

Randall P. Mariger, Kathryn Shaw, Unanticipated Aggregate Disturbances and Tests of the Life-Cycle Consumption Model Using Panel Data, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 48-56