In 1987, the Journal of Labor Economics published an issue on the economics of personnel. Since then, personnel economics, defined as the application of labor economics principles to business issues, has become a major part of labor economics, now accounting for a substantial proportion of papers in this and other journals. Much of the work in personnel economics has been theoretical, in large part because the data needed to test these theories have not been available. In recent years, a number of firm‐based data sets have surfaced that allow personnel economics to be tested. Using two such data sets, I give support to the implications of theories that relate to life‐cycle incentives, tournaments, piecework incentives, pay compression, and peer pressure. I conclude that personnel economics is real. It is far more than a set of clever theories. It has relevance to the real world. Additionally, firm‐based data make asking and answering new kinds of questions feasible. The value of research in this area is high because so little is known compared with other fields in labor economics. Questions about the importance of a worker's relative position in a firm, about intrafirm mobility, about the effect of the firm's business environment on worker welfare, and about the significance of first impressions can be answered using the new data. Finally, I argue that the importance of personnel economics in undergraduate as well as business school curricula will continue to grow.

Abstract This paper discusses the pitfalls in the pricing of barrier options using approximations of the underlying continuous processes via discrete lattice models. To prevent from numerical deficiencies, the space axis is discretized first, and not the time axis. In a Black–Scholes setup, models with improved convergence properties are constructed: a trinomial model and a randomized trinomial model where price changes occur at the jump times of a Poisson process. These lattice models are sufficiently general to handle options with multiple barriers: the numerical difficulties are resolved and extrapolation yields even more accurate results. In a last step, we extend the Black–Scholes setup and incorporate unpredictable discontinuous price movements. The randomized trinomial model can easily be extended to this case, inheriting its superior convergence properties. JEL classification: C63, G12, G13.

This paper presents a rationale for divestiture consistent with one of the reasons frequently cited by divesting firms, namely, that the firm is undervalued and splitting the firm into its component businesses will make it easier for the market to value the components accurately. When firms are undervalued due to unobservability of divisional cash flows, they may resort to divestiture to raise capital while overvalued firms will use external equity. Diversification thus might result in costly future divestiture. Firms trade off this expected cost of diversification against the benefit of higher levels of cheaper internal capital in deciding the scope of the firm. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G34, L22.

Venture capital limited partnerships are an attractive arena to study cross-sectional and time-series variations in compensation schemes. We empirically examine 419 partnerships. The compensation of new and smaller funds displays considerably less sensitivity to performance and less variation than that of other funds. The fixed base component of compensation is higher for younger and smaller firms. We observe no relation between incentive compensation and performance. Our evidence is consistent with a learning model, in which the pay of new venture capitalists is less sensitive to performance because reputational concerns induce them to work hard.

We examine the loss in utility for a consumer who ignores any or all of the following: (1) the multi-period nature of the consumer's portfolio-choice problem, (2) the empirically documented predictability of asset returns, or (3) transaction costs. Both the costs of behaving myopically and ignoring predictability can be substantial, although allowing for intermediate consumption reduces these costs. Ignoring realistic transaction costs (fixed and proportional) imposes significant utility costs that range from 0.8% up to 16.9% of wealth. For the scenarios that we consider, the presence of transaction costs always increases the utility cost of behaving myopically, but decreases the utility cost of ignoring predictability.

Can we know how good future economic growth can be if we do not know how good it has been? Apparent changes in the structure of the economy, notably, the rise of information technology, skill-extensive technical change, and a potential reversion to nonmarket production, will serve to increase the effort needed to maintain our already tenuous grasp on measuring income, wages, and well-being. Piecing together available measures, the United States appears to have been experiencing substantial economic growth as measured by both per-family income and wealth. The well-known dispersion of income by education is evident, with earnings of those with less than high-school education on the decline, but rising for those with college education or more. For families in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) headed by a male aged 25–64, mean family income rose by 11.5 percent, from $58,585 (1997 CPI-U dollars) for 1983 to $65,292 for 1993. If one factors in a 1-percent per annum correction factor to the CPI (Matthew D. Shapiro and David W. Wilcox, 1997; Michael J. Boskin et al., 1998), average real family income grew on the order of 22 percent in 10 years. Rising family income is not explained simply by more workers per family, since the civilian labor-force participation rate rose only 1.5 percentage points, from 65.3 percent in 1986 to 66.8 percent in 1996. Nor does the rise in income appear to be the result of more market hours per week. If anything, hours per worker may have declined, overall. Average weekly hours in the private sector are reported to have changed only trivially, declining from

Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), (Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155–1177) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, we cannot conclude (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance.

Abstract This paper examines the relation between earnings and operating cash flow to derive and test an indicator of financial statement fraud. Accrual measurement concepts indicate that financial statement fraud should be associated with high levels of earnings relative to operating cash flow. We demonstrate that the excess of earnings over operating cash flow is extreme in most fraud cases in years immediately prior to the fraud discovery based on a sample of 56 fraud cases from 1978 to 1991. We compare the distribution of the earnings minus operating cash flow variable for fraud firms with that for a sample of 60,453 firm‐years for firms listed on COMPUSTAT. We test a logistic regression model in which the discovery/nondiscovery of fraud is the dependent variable, and earnings minus operating cash flow is the explanatory variable. Other control variables are included in the model based on prior studies. Results are consistent with expectations derived from accrual measurement theory. We then examine the predictive ability of the model using our sample of fraud firms and a sample of nonfraud firms in the same four‐digit SIC code industries. Observations for the fraud firms are for the fiscal year prior to the discovery of fraud. Observations for the nonfraud firms are for the same fiscal years as the fraud firms in the same industries. The predictive ability of the model, including the excess of earnings over operating cash flow, is substantially higher than the predictive ability of the model omitting this variable. We conclude that the earnings‐operating cash flow relation provides important information for those interested in identifying financial statement fraud, especially when considered in conjunction with other factors associated with fraud risk.