This paper examines the costs, wealth effects, and determinants of international capital raising for a sample of 260 public debt issues made by non-U.S. firms in the Yankee bond market. We find that investors demand economically significant premiums on bonds issued by firms that are located in countries that do not protect investors' rights and do not have a prior history of ongoing disclosure. The results provide support for the literature that suggests better legal protections and more detailed information disclosure increases the price investors will pay for financial assets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F3, G1.

INTEREST GROUPS are ubiquitous in U.S.politics and in the political systems of most nations. In some countries, interest groups are closely aligned with political par-ties and exercise influence through those

In Special Interest Politics Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman examine how special-interest groups influence political outcomes for the benefit of their members. The authors take interest groups seriously by considering a range of theories and supporting evidence on interest group activity. Their book provides perspectives on how to study interest group politics and a set of methods for that study. Although the authors present a number of standard models, the book contains much that is new. The reader takes away a multitude of results, tools, models, and new research ideas. The result is an outstanding book full of insight, useful methods, and perspective.

This study examines the relations between earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings–return relation, and the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East Asian economies. Our results are consistent with two complementary explanations. First, concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures create agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. Consequently, controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors. Second, concentrated ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness as ownership concentration prevents leakage of proprietary information about the firms’ rent-seeking activities.

There is considerable controversy on the role of corporate insider trading in the financial markets. However, there appears to be a consensus view that some form of regulation concerning their activities should be imposed. One such constraint involves a trading ban in periods when corporate insiders are expected to be advantaged vis-à-vis the information flow. This paper directly tests whether constraints of this kind are effective in curtailing insider activity through a study of the trading characteristics of UK company directors. The London Stock Exchange Model Code (1977) imposes a two-month close period prior to company earnings announcements. We find that although the close period affects the timing of director trades, it is unable to affect their performance or distribution. Directors consistently earn abnormal returns irrespective of the period in which they trade. They tend to buy after abnormally bad earnings news and sell after abnormally good earnings news. Moreover, there are systematic differences in the trading patterns of directors surrounding interim and final earnings announcements. It appears that many corporate insiders have private information and exploit this in their trading activities. As a result, one can conclude that trading bans do not impose significant opportunity costs on the trading of corporate insiders.

The pattern of disagreement between bond raters suggests that banks and insurance firms are inherently more opaque than other types of firms. Moody's and S&P split more often over these financial intermediaries, and the splits are more lopsided, as theory here predicts. Uncertainty over the banks stems from certain assets, loans and trading assets in particular, the risks of which are hard to observe or easy to change. Banks' high leverage, which invites agency problems, compounds the uncertainty over their assets. These findings bear on both the existence and reform of bank regulation.

Stock flippers pose a problem for underwriters of initial public offerings (IPOs). They subscribe to the issue, but immediately resell their shares, which may depress the aftermarket price. This paper presents a model of how stock flippers affect IPO pricing. The model shows that the underwriter chooses whether to price the issue as a cold, weak, or hot IPO. Stock flippers have the greatest effect on pricing in weak IPOs and provide an explanation for underwriter stabilization. In contrast to existing models of stabilization, the underwriter gains from after-market purchases, particularly if the contract with the issuer includes an over-allotment option. The over-allotment option encourages a lower offer price, which may lead to under-pricing. These results correspond to recent findings on IPO returns and underwriter stabilization activities.