Bayesian theory predicts an increase in market participants' reliance on reported current earnings to revise their expectations of future earnings when the uncertainty in future earnings is higher. Prior studies focus on price reactions and find negative associations between measures of earnings uncertainty and investors' reliance on reported current earnings. This study examines analysts' forecast revisions (of future earnings) around the announcements of current period earnings and finds positive associations between measures of earnings uncertainty and analysts' reliance on reported current earnings. The findings suggest that uncertainty measures and discount rates are correlated, and cross-sectional differences in the discount rate taint the interpretation of price reactions as evidence of expectation revisions under uncertainty. This study sheds additional light on the complex relationships among earnings uncertainty measures, price reactions to earnings surprise, and cost of capital.

This paper examines impacts of childhood health on socioeconomic status (SES) outcomes observed during adulthood: levels and trajectories of education, family income, household wealth, individual earnings, and labor supply. The analysis is conducted using panel data that collect these SES measures using a sample who were originally children and are now well into their adult years. Since all siblings are in the panel, unmeasured family and neighborhood background effects can be controlled for. With the exception of education, poor childhood health has a quantitatively large effect on all of these outcomes. Moreover, these estimated effects are larger when unobserved family effects are controlled.

Consider a group consisting of S members facing a common budget constraint p'xi=1: any demand vector belonging to the budget set can be (privately or publicly) consumed by the members. Although the intragroup decision process is not known, it is assumed to generate Pareto-efficient outcomes; neither individual consumptions nor intragroup transfers are observable. The paper analyzes when, to what extent, and under which conditions it is possible to recover the underlying structure-individual preferences and the decision process-from the group's aggregate behavior. We show that the general version of the model is not identified. However, a simple exclusion assumption (whereby each member does not consume at least one good) is sufficient to guarantee generic identifiability of the welfare-relevant structural concepts. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

Contrary to the original intention of no‐fault workers’ compensation laws, employers deny liability for a substantial fraction of on‐the‐job injuries. We develop and estimate a simple structural model that explains the high rate of litigation as a consequence of asymmetric information. We estimate the model using data for a large sample of back injuries in Minnesota. Simulations under the counterfactual assumption that all denied workers pursue their claims suggest that the strategic incentive accounts for 30%–40% of observed liability disputes.

[Hedge funds have become important investors in public companies raising equity privately. Hedge funds tend to finance companies that have poor fundamentals and pronounced information asymmetries. To compensate for these shortcomings, hedge funds protect themselves by requiring substantial discounts, negotiating repricing rights, and entering into short positions of the underlying stocks. We find that companies that obtain financing from hedge funds significantly underperform companies that obtain financing from other investors during the following two years. We argue that hedge funds are investors of last resort and provide funding for companies that are otherwise constrained from raising equity capital.]

The theory of human capital is agnostic on what constitutes firm-specific skills. The theory specifies that specific skills contribute to productivity only at the current firm. A broader approach lets all skills be general, but firms use them with different weights attached. For example, computer programming, economics, and accounting are general skills, but there may be only one firm that wants workers trained in all three. One implication is that wage profiles and the split of human capital costs depend on thickness of the market. Another is that firms pay for what appears to be general training. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

ABSTRACT This study uses a large sample of sell‐side bond analysts' reports to examine the properties of recommendations provided by bond analysts and the impact of these recommendations on bond securities. First, we document that the distribution of bond analysts' buy, hold, and sell recommendations is skewed positively, but less so than the distribution of equity analysts' recommendations. The positive skewness in bond analysts' recommendations is greater for low than for high credit quality bonds. Second, we find that bond analysts' reports generate bond trading and return reactions that are both economically significant and greater for low credit quality bonds. The bond market reaction is greater for bond analysts' reports than for equity analysts' reports. Finally, while both bond and equity analysts lead rating agency announcements, we find no evidence of a difference in timeliness between bond and equity analysts' reports. Overall, our results are consistent with bond analysts issuing more negative reports than equity analysts and providing more information about low credit quality bonds as a result of the asymmetric demand for negative information by bond investors.

Corporations uniquely have a tax preference for cash dividends. Nevertheless, dividends do not increase following trades of large-percentage blocks of stock from individuals to corporations. Moreover, although one-third of firms have corporate blockholders, 68% of these firms pay no dividends, and ownership is not clustered at levels that increase the tax benefits of dividends. These findings are not driven by the investing firms' tax rates or by agency problems. Instead, operating companies expand the target firms and pursue joint ventures. Dividends are lower with these investors. Financial investors are not attracted to dividend-paying firms and tend to be passive. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.