The Great Recession focused attention on large financial institutions and systemic risk. We investigate whether large size provides any cost advantages to the economy and, if so, whether these cost advantages are due to technological scale economies or too-big-to-fail subsidies. Estimating scale economies is made more complex by risk-taking. Better diversification resulting from larger scale generates scale economies but also incentives to take more risk. When this additional risk-taking adds to cost, it can obscure the underlying scale economies and engender misleading econometric estimates of them. Using data pre- and post-crisis, we estimate scale economies using two production models. The standard model ignores endogenous risk-taking and finds little evidence of scale economies. The model accounting for managerial risk preferences and endogenous risk-taking finds large scale economies, which are not driven by too-big-to-fail considerations. We evaluate the costs and competitive implications of breaking up the largest banks into smaller banks.

Abstract Factor models yield an R 2 insignificantly different from 0 for one-third of hedge funds in a broad sample. These funds illustrate the concept of market neutrality and feature lower volatilities, higher Sharpe ratios, and higher alphas than other funds, indicating that they provide a successful alternative investment. However, large portfolios of zero- R 2 funds contain fully half the volatility of portfolios of other funds, suggesting that they feature substantial systematic risk. Furthermore, these funds display an increased probability of failure even after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. These results indicate the presence of an omitted factor that exposes investors to significant downside risk.

Harstad and Selten's article in this forum performs a valuable service by highlighting the dominance of optimization-based models over boundedly rational models in modern microeconomics, and questioning whether optimization-based models are a better way forward than boundedly rational models. This article complements Rabin's response to Harstad and Selten, focusing on modeling strategic behavior. I consider Harstad and Selten's examples and proposed boundedly rational models in the light of modern behavioral economics and behavioral game theory, commenting on the challenges that remain and the most promising ways forward. (JEL B40, C72, D01, D03, D80)

The inertia of the local currency prices of traded goods in the face of exchange rate changes is a well-documented phenomenon in International Economics. This paper develops a structural model to identify the sources of this local currency price stability and applies it to micro-data from the beer market. The empirical procedure exploits manufacturers' and retailers' first-order conditions in conjunction with detailed information on the frequency of price adjustments following exchange rate changes to quantify the relative importance of local non-traded cost components, markup adjustment by manufacturers and retailers, and nominal price rigidities in the incomplete transmission of such changes to prices. We find that, on average, approximately 60% of the incomplete exchange rate pass-through is due to local non-traded costs; 8% to markup adjustment; 30% to the existence of own brand price adjustment costs; and 1% to the indirect/strategic effect of such costs, though these results vary considerably across individual brands according to their market shares. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

I study firms with past asbestos ties that suffer from significant increases in legal liabilities after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 1999. This event provides a natural experiment setting to estimate the indirect effects of financial distress on real activities. While direct litigation and bankruptcy costs are significant, value computations and clinical evidence at the operational level show that defendant firms suffer only minor indirect costs of financial distress. Furthermore, these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations during distress. Overall, my results provide support for potentially significant disciplinary effects of non-debt liabilities.

Abstract Based on a textual analysis of initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses, we obtain a number of important findings regarding the relation between the conservatism in prospectuses, IPO pricing, and subsequent operating and stock return performance. First, prospectus conservatism is positively related to underpricing, with the relation more pronounced for technology than nontechnology firms. Second, for nontechnology IPOs, prospectus conservatism is able to predict the firm’s post-IPO operating performance. Specifically, we find that conservatism is inversely related to the firm’s operating performance for the 3 years following the IPO. However, this predictability is limited to nontechnology IPOs. Finally, we find some evidence that for nontechnology IPOs conservatism is inversely related to the firm’s post-IPO abnormal stock return. We conclude that the conservatism contained in an IPO’s prospectus contains useful information about pricing and subsequent operating and stock return performance. Moreover, prospectus conservatism for nontechnology IPOs deserves more attention from investors.

Results of empirical studies of the trade-off theory of capital structure indicate that an important, stable factor is missing from traditional leverage regression models. Our review of theory leads us to the hypothesis that the missing factor is related to profitable growth options (GOs). Specifically, the relationship between optimal leverage and the market-to-book assets ratio (MB), a measure of GOs, is negative and highly convex. In tests of static trade-off theory, we find that a convex (inverse exponential) transformation of MB substantially increases adjusted R2 in leverage regressions, and partially subsumes the explanatory power of median industry leverage. Using the transformed MB variable also yields stronger results in tests of dynamic trade-off theory, including analyses of leverage evolution, speed of adjustment, and external financing activity.

Abstract Managers have the choice to take the firm private themselves in a management buyout or to seek private equity backing. We argue that managers seek private equity backing in case they are more constrained to finance the deal themselves. We confirm the hypothesis using a sample of UK public-to-private transactions over the period 1997–2003. A post going private performance analysis reveals that both management buyouts and private equity backed deals outperform their industry peers. However, private equity backed deals outperform their peers already before the deal takes place whereas management buyouts improve performance afterwards. This suggests a passive role for private equity firms in going private transactions.

We develop an equilibrium model of the US labor market, fit to Panel Study of Income Dynamics data from 1968–96. Our main innovation is a finer differentiation of types of labor than in prior work (i.e., by occupation, education, gender, and age). This lets us fit wage and employment patterns better than simpler models. We obtain a good fit to wages and occupational choices over the 29-year period while also explaining college attendance rates. We use the model to assess factors driving changes in the wage structure. Occupational demand shifts and shifts in demand for college labor and female labor within occupations are key factors.

Abstract This paper presents the first empirical evidence showing that the marriage of a member of the controlling family adds value to public corporations. The results, based on a uniquely comprehensive data set from Thailand, show that the family firm’s stock price increases when the partner is from either a prominent business or a political family. Abnormal returns tend to be higher for firms whose operation depends on extensive networks. In contrast, marriages to ordinary citizens are not associated with any abnormal returns. These findings are generally supportive of the value of networks in general and marriage in particular.