We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.

We conduct a comprehensive study of commonality in liquidity using intraday spread and depth data from 47 stock exchanges. We find that firm-level changes in liquidity are significantly influenced by exchange-level changes across most of the world’s stock exchanges. Emerging Asian exchanges have exceptionally strong commonality, while those of Latin America exhibit little if any commonality. After documenting the pervasive role of commonality within individual exchanges, we examine commonality across exchanges. We find evidence of a distinct, global component in bid-ask spreads and depths. Local (exchange-level) sources of commonality represent roughly 39% of the firm’s total commonality in liquidity, while global sources contribute an additional 19%. We also investigate potential sources of exchange-level and global commonality. We show that commonality is driven by both domestic and U.S. macroeconomic announcements.

We examine the impact of block ownership on the firm’s trading activity and secondary-market liquidity. Our empirical results show that block ownership takes potential trading activity off the table relative to a diffuse ownership structure and impairs the firm’s market liquidity. These adverse liquidity effects disappear, however, once we control for trading activity. Our findings suggest that block ownership is detrimental to the firm’s market liquidity because of its adverse impact on trading activity—a real friction effect. After controlling for this real friction effect, we find little evidence that block ownership has a negative impact on informational friction. Our results suggest that the relative lack of trading, and not the threat of informed trading, explains the inverse relation between block ownership and market liquidity.