We examine voluntary disclosures around the exercise of CEO stock options. Previous research shows that managerial incentives depend on the intended disposition of the exercised options' underlying shares. When CEOs intend to sell the underlying shares of exercised options, they have an incentive to increase stock prices in the pre-exercise period. In contrast, when CEOs intend to hold the underlying shares, they have a tax incentive to decrease stock prices in the pre-exercise period. Consistent with these private incentives, we find a significant increase in the frequency and magnitude of good (bad) news announcements in the pre-exercise period when CEOs implement exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold) strategies. We provide some evidence that CEOs' propensities for opportunistic disclosures are positively related to the value of their exercised stock options. Lastly, we find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) generally reduces, but does not eliminate, this type of managerial opportunism.

Recent theoretical research suggests that information production is a positive externality of aggregate economic activity (Veldkamp, 2005). Both the quantity and quality of information increase during periods of economic expansion and decrease during periods of contraction. Based on this insight, we hypothesize and confirm that time-varying information production drives the comovement patterns observed in stock returns. We examine stock return comovement in 36 countries from 1980 to 2007 and show that, consistent with the theory, comovement patterns are countercyclical; that is, when information production is high (low), comovement is low (high). We also find that the relation between comovement and the business cycle is stronger in countries that experience large intertemporal swings in information production. Finally, we show that the relation between business cycle and comovement is stronger in poor countries, countries with less developed financial markets, and countries with weaker accounting and transparency standards. These results suggest that financial development and transparency are conducive to a steady flow of financial information over the business cycle.

Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that short‐maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short‐maturity debt. We also find that short‐maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega‐ and delta‐related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short‐term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.