We propose that corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment serves as an intangible investment in stakeholder relationships to guard against external disruptions to firms' operations and tangible assets. Using a difference-in-differences setting and a database of factory locations, we show that manufacturing firms with higher CSR ratings are much less affected by major natural disasters in terms of operating performance. We then propose two mechanisms through which CSR engagement shields manufacturing firms against external disruptions: employee motivation and customer loyalty. Empirical evidence suggests that CSR helps manufacturing firms survive major natural disasters by motivating employees, which leads to higher post-disaster productivity, and keeping customers, which leads to more stable post-disaster sales.

In this article, we show that firms can become conservative in innovation when their directors face job insecurity. We find that after the staggered enactment of majority voting legislation that strengthens shareholders’ power in director elections, firms produce fewer patents, particularly exploratory patents, and fewer forward citations. This effect is stronger for directors facing higher dismissal costs or threats and for firms with greater needs for board expertise and is mitigated by institutional investors’ expertise in innovation. Overall, our results suggest that heightened job insecurity induces director myopia, which leads to a reduction in investment in risky, long-term innovation projects.