A multilateral currency union removes intraregional exchange rates but not the union rate. The pre-union intraregional exchange rate variability is thus latent; a two-step procedure is developed to measure this. The measured variables are used to model inflation and intraregional trade growth of individual union members. Counterfactual simulations of the union impact are carried out using the resulting models. Application to ASEAN+3 shows that the intraregional variability mainly consists of short-run exchange rate shocks, that the variability significantly affects inflation and intraregional trade of major ASEAN+3 members, and that a union would reduce inflation and promote trade regionwide.

This paper examines the pricing efficiency of 8‐K filings for events other than earnings announcements. Since these filings provide timely information that is material to investors and explain variations in quarterly returns to a degree similar to other disclosures, understanding how the stock price absorbs their information is important for investors, regulators, and academics. By testing the statistical correlation between the immediate stock returns in response to these filings and subsequent stock returns before, during, and after the forthcoming earnings announcement, we find evidence of investor overreaction to good news but underreaction to bad news in the immediate window. Essentially, the price increases too much for good news but fails to decrease enough for bad news, resulting in overpricing for both. Most of the correction for this overpricing occurs in the period leading up to the forthcoming earnings announcement, while the rest happens during the announcement. Drawing on Miller (1977), we further illustrate that, in the presence of short‐sale constraints, increase in investor disagreement spurred by interpretation difficulty is the most likely mechanism for the observed overpricing. We fail to find sufficient evidence in support of alternative mechanisms, including managerial disclosure strategies, analyst optimistic bias, and retail investor participation. This asymmetric mispricing for non‐earnings 8‐Ks contrasts with the symmetric mispricing commonly found for other types of disclosures, where investors either systematically underreact or overreact to public information. Our results could broadly speak to the pricing of other public information that is inherently difficult to interpret.

We examine whether U.S. immigration policy, specifically the H‐1B visa program, affects the likelihood of financial misconduct. We argue that employers have leverage over employees on H‐1B visas because such employees must maintain H‐1B–eligible employment to legally reside in the United States. We posit that companies relying on H‐1B visas to hire workers in accounting roles have an increased ability to misreport their financial statements due to the greater costs H‐1B employees face if they are unexpectedly fired for not following the demands of their bosses or for blowing the whistle on misconduct. Using the sharp reduction in the H‐1B visa cap in 2004 as a shock to such employment, we find that companies that relied on this visa program for accounting roles pre‐shock experience a 2.3 percentage point decline in accounting irregularities post‐shock. Cross‐sectional tests show that the reduction in irregularities is greater in companies where H‐1B employees have (1) a greater influence on financial reporting or (2) fewer job opportunities. In addition, the relation between H‐1B visa use and irregularities is stronger in companies whose investors are more focused on near‐term earnings targets. We corroborate our findings using the outcome of H‐1B visa lotteries as shocks to such employment.

We document strikingly opposite time‐series patterns of analyst forecast errors (FEs) and associated market reactions, illustrating that analyst forecasts have become a less useful benchmark of the market's earnings expectations in recent years. The mean FE has increased from negative one to two cents in the 1990s to positive one to two cents in the 2010s, whereas average earnings announcement returns have declined from 0.30% in the 1990s to −0.30% in the 2010s, turning negative in the past 17 years. Underlying the time‐series pattern of increasing FEs is a secular trend where firms move away from just meeting or beating, to which the market reaction has become increasingly negative, toward a large beat, while the frequency of meeting or beating the consensus analyst forecast remains stable during the same period. We develop a parsimonious predictive model of earnings surprises based on peer and past analysts' FEs and find that our predicted FE closely mirrors reported FE, with the average value hovering around one to two cents in most years of the past two decades. The market reaction to “around zero” unexpected FE (FE minus predicted FE) is indistinguishable from zero over time, suggesting that our model serves as a good benchmark of the market's expectation. Our evidence has broad implications for appropriate earnings benchmarking, for the disappearing discontinuity of the earnings surprise distribution around zero, for earnings management to beat analysts' forecasts, for empirical designs when examining the earnings‐return relation, and for the disappearing earnings announcement premium.

This study focuses on the effect of disclosure processing frictions in labor markets. We go back in time 30 years ago and examine whether firms facing strong organized labor strategically responded to the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, which substantially reduced labor unions’ information processing costs. Consistent with firms having incentives to maintain an information advantage over unions for bargaining purposes, we find that they reduce financial statement disaggregation, the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts, and the proportion of good news forecasts. Our study is the first to investigate the implications of information processing costs for labor markets and suggests that an SEC mandate intended to reduce disclosure processing costs for investors caused unintended strategic responses by firms facing proprietary cost of disclosures in other markets. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.