This paper reviews and analyzes the legal and economic aspects of the duty of best execution. Although a well-established principle of securities trading, we show that the dual problems of definition and enforcement make best execution both unwieldy and unworkable as a mandated legal duty. We examine the impact of several market practices on best execution, in particular payment for order flow, preferencing and internalization practices, and price improvement and order execution protocols. We suggest three possible directions for the future rule and interpretation of the duty of best execution.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G10, G18, K22, K23.

In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the potential benefits of more accurate costing systems. Subjects in our experiment participated in one of four single‐person decision making settings, which varied in terms of the accuracy of costing systems (less accurate versus more accurate cost reports) and in the complexity of the economic environment (less heterogeneous versus more heterogeneous products). The costing systems provided imperfect reports that subjects could use to select forecasts of future product costs. Forecast accuracy determined the resulting payoffs for subjects. In addition to having the cost reports when making forecasts, subjects also observed the association between forecasts and actual profits for previous periods and the rank ordering of the products' relative usage of resources at each of the production processes. The results from our experiment indicate that subjects did not select forecasts based only on reported costs. Rather they updated forecasts using profit feedback and the supplemental rank information about the products' relative usage of resources. We found that profits decreased as the complexity of economic environment increased but increased with the accuracy of cost reports. The profits associated with less accurate costing systems, however, were not as low as we would have predicted had the subjects used the cost reports as their forecasts. In fact, using profit feedback, subjects were able to converge toward optimal profits even with imperfect cost information.

Management compensation is often categorized as either sensitive or insensitive to firm performance. This one-dimensional treatment ignores the variation in the types and terms of compensation contracts. Through a cross-sectional examination of share-holder-authorized compensation arrangements, this paper demonstrates that the terms of stock option and restricted stock plans, and the flexibility afforded the board of directions in negotiating with managers, vary systematically with the characteristics of the assets being managed. This variation in compensation contracting challenges theorists to incorporate the richness of management contracts into models of incentive pay.

The literature on conditional event-study methods criticizes standard event-study procedures as being misspecified if events are voluntary and investors are rational. We argue, however, that standard procedures (1) lead to statistically valid inferences, under conditions described in this article; and (2) are often a superior means of inference, even when event-study data are generated exactly as per a class of rational expectations specifications introduced by the conditional methods literature. Our results provide an equilibrium justification for traditional event-study methods, and we suggest how these simple procedures may be combined with conditional methods to improve statistical power in event studies.

This study uses experimental methods to assess how different legal regimes affect the frequency and amounts of settlements in a three person setting (one plaintiff and two defendants). The four legal regimes investigated differ along two dimensions: (1) allocation of liability, either ‘joint and several’ or proportionate liability, and (2) liability mappings, either unconditional or conditional mappings. We find that the lowest settlement frequencies occur in regimes with joint and several allocation rules. In addition, joint and several rules have the most adverse effects on the defendants' wealth.

This paper investigates whether sophisticated investors rely more on analyst forecasts than on time-series model forecasts in forming expected earnings. Although analyst forecasts are generally more accurate than time-series model forecasts (e.g., O'Brien [1988]), analyst forecasts are not clearly superior to time-series model forecasts as a proxy for expected earnings (e.g., Brown et al. [1987b]). Recent research has concluded that earnings expectations reflected in stock prices at least partially reflect a seasonal random walk (SRW) model (Bernard and Thomas [1990] and Abarbanell and Bernard [1992]). In particular, Ball and Bartov [1996] find that market earnings expectations incorporate the sign of the serial correlation in seasonally differenced earnings but underestimate the correlation magnitude (see also Maines and Hand [1996]). These findings suggest that at least some market participants ignore public information in forming expected earnings; I examine whether information usage is correlated with investor sophistication and/or the degree to which investors are informed.

The paper tests whether technological change has been neutral in Canadian manufacturing industries, using a system of translog cost share equations for 1962 through 1986. The model features two classes of labor treated as distinct inputs. Tests rejected homotheticity in all industries. Hicks neutrality was also rejected in 16 of 18 industries. The most common pattern of nonneutral technical change was a bias away from blue-collar workers. Formal tests for skill-neutral innovation rejected the hypothesis in ten industries in favor of skill-using technical change. The results suggest that in studies of Canadian manufacturing, aggregation across labor inputs is inappropriate.