Value premiums, which we define as value portfolio returns in excess of market portfolio returns, are on average much lower in the second half of the July 1963–June 2019 period. But the high volatility of monthly premiums prevents us from rejecting the hypothesis that expected premiums are the same in both halves of the sample. Regressions that forecast value premiums with book-to-market ratios in excess of market (BM–BMM) produce more reliable evidence of second-half declines in expected value premiums, but only if we assume the regression coefficients are constant during the sample period. Received: January 21, 2020; editorial decision: July 21, 2020; Editor: Jeffrey Pontiff.

Using an experiment, I examine whether managers have preferences for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a capital budgeting setting and the factors that influence the extent to which they act on these preferences. I find that managers have and act on preferences for CSR by reporting to implement higher cost CSR investments that reduce firm profit even when they have financial incentives not to do so. I also find that when managers need to misreport to act on their preferences for CSR, their willingness to act on such preferences is decreased due to a desire to be honest. Conversely, an opportunity to create slack for personal benefit increases managers’ willingness to act on their CSR preferences, offsetting the decrease resulting from honesty concerns. Together these findings demonstrate that managers’ preferences for CSR investments can influence behavior even in the presence of competing economic incentives and social norms. Finally, an analysis of firm profit shows that firms may be better off financially with managers who act on preferences for CSR investments rather than managers who have strong preferences for wealth. This result obtains because managers with strong CSR preferences do not create slack to the same extent as managers with strong preferences for wealth. These results have implications for both theory and practice because they show that managers’ reports used to make investment decisions are influenced by their personal CSR preferences.

This study presents new evidence on the impacts of unionization using administrative data matching workers to employers in a regression discontinuity design. Close union elections exhibit substantial nonrandom selection or manipulation. Estimates accounting for this selection show that unionization substantially decreases payroll, employment, average worker earnings, and establishment survival. Payroll and earnings decreases are driven by composition changes, with older and higher-paid workers leaving unionizing establishments and younger workers joining or staying. Worker-level effects on earnings are small and are reconciled with large negative establishment-level effects in a model of employer and employee selection into union jobs.

Religiosity may impact firm risk taking via its risk averse employees or through risk-sensitive demand. Using detailed financial statements of property-liability insurance companies, we find that both religiosity at firms' headquarters and the religiosity of firms' largest geographic market are negatively related to firm risk taking. For firms with one salient market, the impact of market religiosity is approximately the same order of magnitude as headquarter religiosity. Our evidence suggests that firm risk taking is influenced by customer demand.

We use changes in mandatory pension funding to investigate the relation between internal financing constraints and incremental investment. Pension funding relief enacted in 2012 significantly reduced mandatory employer contributions to defined benefit pension plans. Prior to learning of the pension relief, firms disclosed their expected pension contributions under FAS 132R, which allows us to infer changes in investment plans in response to this unanticipated pension relief. Although our setting is pensions, our inferences contribute to the broader literature on how access to finance impacts the firm. We predict and find that pension relief resulted in increased nonpension investment in the year after enactment for financially constrained firms, and is stronger for constrained firms with greater pension underfunding. Our results are consistent with pension relief providing an important means of funding investment for financially constrained firms. Our identification strategy and results provide an important innovation to the literature examining the effect of financing constraints on investment.

We provide evidence on earnings management by exploiting temporary exogenous shocks to utility firms’ sales arising from weather variation. We find that sample firms’ sales are highly sensitive to annual changes in average temperatures in the region where the firm operates, but this sensitivity disappears quickly as one moves down the income statement. This evidence, while indirect, is suggestive of earnings management activities. In search of direct evidence, we study charitable giving decisions by sample firms and uncover a significant positive sensitivity of charitable spending to weather-driven demand shocks, behavior that is highly consistent with the presence of real earnings management efforts. We find no convincing evidence supporting possible alternative explanations for this evidence, but we do find limited support for the presence of a larger giving–weather relation when earnings management incentives are likely to be elevated. If other real decisions with similar characteristics scale proportionally to charitable giving, our findings suggest that the overall magnitude of real earnings management activities could be quite substantial.

Using data for three cohorts of women in the PSID, we show that annual earnings inequality fell sharply between the late 1960s and the mid-1990s, with a large decline in the component attributable to the extensive margin. We then fit earnings-generating models that incorporate both intensive- and extensive-margin dynamics to data for the three cohorts. Our models suggest that more than 80% of the decline in female earnings inequality can be attributed to a weakening of the link between family-based factors (i.e., children and the presence and incomes of partners) and the intensive and extensive margins of earnings determination.

In November 2011, the Financial Stability Board, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, published a list of 29 "systemically important financial institutions" (SIFIs, now referred to as "globally systemically important banks" or G-SIBs), institutions whose failure, by virtue of "their size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness", could have dramatic negative consequences for the global financial system. While "size" and "interconnectedness" have been the subject of much quantitative analysis, less attention has been paid to measuring "complexity." Yet without a consistent way to measure complexity, there is little guarantee that the designated SIFIs capture the complexity that the FSB is concerned about, and little hope of mitigating the consequences that the FSB warns of. In this paper we propose the structure of an individual firm's majority-control hierarchy as a proxy for institutional complexity. We demonstrate as a proof-of-concept how this method might be used by bank supervisors, particularly the Federal Reserve under its authority as consolidated supervisor, using a data set containing information on the majority-control hierarchies of many of the designated SIFIs. Our mathematical intrafirm network representation (and various associated metrics we propose) provides a uniform way to compare firms with often very disparate organizational structures – one that is distinct from a simple size comparison.

We develop a theory of sweat equity—the value of business owners’ time and expenses to build customer bases, client lists, and other intangible assets. We discipline the theory using data from U.S. national accounts, business censuses, and brokered sales to estimate a value for sweat equity in the private business sector equal to 1.2 times U.S. GDP, which is about the same magnitude as the value of fixed assets in use in these businesses. For a typical owner, 26% of the sweat equity is transferable through inheritance or sale. The equity values are positively correlated with business incomes and standard measures of markups based on accounting data, but not with owners’ financial assets or standard measures of business total factor productivity. We use our theory to show that abstracting from sweat activity leads to a significant understatement of the effects of lowering business income tax rates on private business activity for both the extensive and intensive margins. Despite finding larger responses, our model’s implied tax elasticities of establishments and owner hours are in line with empirical estimates in the public finance literature. Allowing for financial constraints and superstar firms does not overturn our main findings.

Existing studies have developed increasingly sophisticated accounts of the performative agency of valuation devices and their effects on markets and organizations. In particular, research has focused on the work of different actors to legitimize valuation devices and ensure their adoption, which then leads to performativity. This paper extends work on the legitimacy and performativity of valuation devices by developing a dynamic, non-linear theorization of the boundary conditions of performativity and the feedbacks that result in changes in performativity over time. We ask: How do evolutions in a valuation device’s legitimacy relate to its performativity? Our analysis is based on a longitudinal study of the profits per equity partner (PEP) metric which between 1995 and 2013 became established as a key valuation device for English law firms. Through this case we draw attention to the dynamic legitimacy-performativity nexus . We show how the waxing and waning of different forms of legitimacy, in line with the dynamics of the broader institutional environment, affect the performativity of a particular valuation device. We also reveal a performativity paradox . The more a device gains legitimacy the more it becomes influential and exercises performative effects. The more this happens, the more the risk that tensions, contradictions and challenges will arise and begin to undermine the valuation device’s legitimacy and consequently its performativity. Consequently, we contribute to better theorizing the dynamic links between legitimacy, performativity and counter-performativity.