Bundling managerial earnings guidance with quarterly earnings announcements (EAs) has become an increasingly common practice. This study investigates the impact of bundled guidance on analysts' forecast revisions. Our findings indicate that analysts respond more to bundled guidance than non‐bundled guidance. This effect increases with analysts' time pressure and cognitive constraints around the EA. Analysts' revisions also incorporate more of the bundled management guidance when accompanied by additional information, such as conference calls. We further find that analysts revise their forecasts more quickly following bundled guidance than non‐bundled guidance. Together, these findings are consistent with the notion that analysts place more weight on bundled guidance than on non‐bundled guidance in their forecast revisions as bundled guidance facilities analysts' timely forecast revisions following EAs. Finally, we find that analysts' forecast revisions following bundled guidance generate significant market reactions. Our findings enhance our understanding of analysts' information processing and shed light on why bundling can be an effective guidance strategy.

We examine how labor market competition affects the quality of workplace information on social media. Using employer reviews on Glassdoor for U.S. publicly listed firms from 2011 to 2022, we find that reviews become less informative about actual workplace practices when firms face more intense competition for labor, consistent with competition inducing workplace information management. The decline in review informativeness is more pronounced when employees have narrower external networks, when firms are less unionized, and when firms have a smaller review base, suggesting that workplace information management is more likely when labor market information asymmetry is greater. Additional analyses show that positive reviews in highly competitive labor markets predict higher short-term labor inflows but greater subsequent employee turnover, indicating a gap between managed expectations and actual workplace conditions. Taken together, our evidence suggests that labor market competition potentially distorts the crowdsourced signals available to job seekers on anonymous review websites.

We posit that management forecasts, which are predictable transformations of realized earnings without random errors, are more informative than unbiased forecasts, which manifest small but unpredictable errors, even if biased forecasts are less accurate. Consistent with this intuition, we find that managers who make consistent forecasting errors have a greater ability to influence investor reactions and analyst revisions, even after controlling for the effect of accuracy. This effect is more economically significant and statistically robust than that of forecast accuracy. More sophisticated investors and experienced analysts are found to have a better understanding of the benefits of consistent management forecasts.

We investigate whether non-GAAP earnings disclosures increase stock price crash risk. Consistent with non-GAAP disclosures allowing managers to inflate investors’ perceptions about firm performance, our results indicate that income increasing non-GAAP reporting increases crash risk. We also find that managers can use non-GAAP reporting as a substitute for earnings management to withhold bad news from investors (the traditional explanation for crashes). Finally, we find a positive association between non-GAAP reporting and the likelihood of subsequent events that can trigger a crash. Overall, our evidence is consistent with some non-GAAP disclosures exposing investors to risks of large and sudden price declines.

This study examines how managers' use of expectation management is affected by their labor market mobility, which we measure by the enforceability of noncompete provisions in their employment contracts. Exploiting quasinatural experiments, our difference‐in‐differences analyses provide new causal insights to the growing literature on how managers' career concerns affect their disclosure choices. Consistent with a less mobile labor market imposing more pressure on managers to achieve earnings expectations, we predict and find that managers in US states that tightened enforcement of noncompete provisions are more likely to manage analyst expectations downward. We also find that downward expectation management is used to a greater extent than other tools such as real and accrual‐based earnings management. Additional analysis shows that the increase in expectation management is more pronounced for CEOs with lower general skills or shorter tenures, for firms with more independent boards, and for industries that are more homogeneous. Our path analysis suggests a significant link between increased use of expectation management after tightened noncompete enforcement and meeting and beating earnings expectations, which in turn is linked to lower executive turnover. Overall, our findings suggest that expectation management is an important channel through which noncompete enforcement reduces executive labor market mobility. Our study sheds light on the underlying mechanism through which labor market mobility affects disclosure choices and has important implications for both firms and regulators on the use and enforcement of noncompete provisions.

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8‐K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10‐K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws affect firms' disclosure policies. We find that the effect of UD laws on corporate disclosure is driven by firms facing relatively higher ex ante derivative litigation risk and higher operating uncertainty, as well as firms for which shareholder litigation is a more important mechanism to discipline managers.

Human estimation and inference are subject to systematic biases such as overconfidence and over-optimism. In contrast to prior research that has identified multiple negative consequences of these biases, we focus on positive effects. We empirically examine a setting in which over-optimism a) is a related but different bias from overconfidence, b) emerges dynamically in a rational economic framework, and c) generates higher managerial effort. Importantly, this additional effort improves firm profitability and market value.

We examine how common institutional investors (CIIs) facilitate the financial reporting comparability (FRC) of US firms. Common ownership increases FRC of firms that are directly owned by CIIs (via a direct effect) and has positive spillover effects on other firms in the same industry. We find spillover effects in two types of firms: (1) those that are commonly owned by different institutional investors but are connected through common firms, and (2) those that do not have any common ownership. These results suggest that the effect of common ownership goes beyond commonly owned firms and extends to non‐commonly owned firms. Furthermore, we find two mechanisms for the direct and spillover effects of common ownership on reporting comparability: firms' hiring of common auditors and their adoption of similar accounting practices. Overall, we provide comprehensive evidence on how common institutional ownership benefits the comparability of financial reporting in the United States.

Overconfident CEOs are more willing to initiate investment projects that require experimentation, yet tend to defer responding to the bad news when the project is not performing as planned. Accounting conservatism accelerates the recognition of the bad news and its dissemination to gatekeepers, making it more likely that the CEO will acknowledge the problem earlier and start searching for solutions. Therefore, firms where both characteristics—CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism—are present should perform better. Our empirical tests confirm this prediction: firms that practice conservative accounting and are run by overconfident CEOs exhibit better cash flow performance. Our results continue to hold in a variety of settings, including market reactions to acquisitions, cash flow downside risk, and analyst following. Further, the joint positive effect of CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism on firm performance is stronger in high-uncertainty environments and in firms facing less stringent financing constraints, consistent with theoretical predictions.

Using influenza epidemic data, we examine how constraints on corporate information production affect disclosure policies. We find that firms in areas with higher flu activity are less likely to issue short‐run earnings forecasts and more likely to issue long‐run earnings forecasts. These results are more pronounced when the information production process is more complex, when managers face a greater reputational loss for issuing low‐quality short‐run forecasts, and when firms’ costs of switching the forecast horizon are lower. Further analysis implies that the effect of flu activity on these forecast issuance decisions is not driven by firm performance or information uncertainty. Our results suggest that managers do not simply avoid issuing forecasts in response to information production constraints. Instead, they shift the forecast horizon from short‐run to long‐run, appearing to balance the costs of issuing low‐quality forecasts with those of not issuing forecasts at all.