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A Theory of Participative Budgeting

The Accounting Review 2014 89(3), 1025-1050
This paper complements the ongoing empirical discussion surrounding participative budgeting by comparing its economic merits relative to a top-down budgeting alternative. In both budgeting regimes, private information is communicated vertically between a principal and a manager. We show that top-down budgeting incurs fewer agency costs than bottom-up budgeting whenever the level of information asymmetry is relatively low. Although the choice between top-down and bottom-up budgeting ultimately determines who receives private information within the firm, we find that both the principal and manager's preferences over the allocation of private information remain qualitatively similar across the two budgeting paradigms. Specifically, while the principal always prefers either minimal or maximal private information, the manager prefers an interim or maximal level of private information regardless of who is privately informed. Last, we use our model to address empirical inconsistencies relating the firm's choice of budgeting process, the resulting budgetary slack, and performance.

Optimal Information Asymmetry

The Accounting Review 2006 81(3), 677-712
At the heart of decentralization lies the notion that tasks are delegated by owners to managers who possess superior local information. The extent of this information asymmetry is often an endogenous construct, as it is influenced by the owner's choice of internal accounting systems and the manager's investment in acquiring local expertise. In this paper, we explore how varying levels of pre-contract, asymmetric information affect the owner-manager relationship. We provide three main sets of insights. First, we find that the owner's payoffs are initially decreasing, and strictly convex everywhere, in the quality of the manager's private information. The owner thus prefers to deal with either a perfectly informed or a perfectly uninformed manager, and we characterize conditions for either to be the preferred choice. Second, in contrast to recent work, we demonstrate that when information can be communicated internally, the optimal strength of managerial incentives unambiguously decreases as the manager becomes better informed. Third, we derive the surprising result that a self-interested manager does not always prefer to maximize his informational advantage. Our work has implications for the optimal design of organizations, and for internal accounting and control systems in particular.

Workplace Knowledge Flows*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2020 135(3), 1635-1680 open access
We conducted a field experiment in a sales firm to test whether improving knowledge flows between coworkers affects productivity. Our design allows us to compare different management practices and isolate whether frictions to knowledge transmission primarily reside with knowledge seekers, knowledge providers, or both. We find large productivity gains from treatments that reduced frictions for knowledge seekers. Workers who were encouraged to seek advice from a randomly chosen partner during structured meetings had average sales gains exceeding 15%. These effects lasted at least 20 weeks after the experiment ended. Treatments intended to change knowledge providers’ willingness to share information, in the form of incentives tied to partners’ joint output, led to positive—but transitory—sales gains. Directing coworkers to share knowledge raised average productivity and reduced output dispersion between workers, highlighting the role that management practices play in generating spillovers inside the firm.