This paper analyzes strategic communication in equilibrium models of conventional and final-offer interest arbitration. Both models emphasize the role of learning by the arbitrator from the parties' offers about the state of the employment relationship, which is known to the parties but not to the arbitrator. The analysis focuses on separating equilibria in which the arbitrator's behavior is identical to the reduced-form decision rule typically assumed in the empirical literature. The paper thereby provides a structural interpretation for the existing empirical work.

This paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece-rate compensation schemes. The informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece-rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century. The formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting. The main result is as follows. In a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action, if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior, then no compensation scheme, piece-rate or otherwise, can induce the worker not to restrict output.

This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns--concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. We show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance.

We provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an asymmetric-information model of layoffs. When firms have discretion with respect to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of low ability. Assuming that no such negative inference is warranted if workers are displaced in a plant closing, postdisplacement wages should be lower and postdisplacement unemployment spells should be longer for those displaced by layoffs than for those displaced by plant closings, but predisplacement wages should not differ by cause of displacement. Evidence on displaced workers from Current Population Surveys supports all three of our model's predictions.

This paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter-industry wage differentials: (1) true wage differentials exist across industries, and (2) the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers' productive abilities. First, we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured-ability explanation. Second, we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job-change decisions can create important self-selection biases even in first-differenced estimates of industry wage differentials. Third, we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss. We find that (i) the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross-section, and (ii) pre-displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post-displacement wage determination.

In previous work, we showed that a model that integrates job assignment, human capital acquisition, and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms. In this article, we extend that model in two ways. First, we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence. Second, and more important, we show that introducing “task‐specific” human capital allows us to produce cohort effects. We further argue that task‐specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications. We also discuss limitations of our (extended) approach.

This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns--concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. The authors show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. The authors find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance.

Dans cet article, nous cherchons à développer un modèle par lequel le salaire d'un travailleur est fonction de ses qualifications. Le marché ainsi que le travailleur sont au préalable dans l'incertitude quant à certaines de ces qualifications. L'endogénéité à la fois des changements de salaire et des décisions de changements du secteur d'affiliation résulte du processus d'apprentissage relié aux qualifications du travailleur. Nous montrons ensuite comment le modèle peut être estimé par les méthodes des variables instrumentales non-linéaires. Nous appliquons notre méthodologie à l'étude des salaires et de l'allocation des travailleurs aux différentes occupations et industries. Nous trouvons que les secteurs à salaires élevés emploient des travailleurs ayant davantage de qualifications et que ces secteurs rémunèrent ces qualifications à un taux supérieur relativement aux secteurs à faibles salaires. Les estimés des rendements associés aux qualifications qui ne tiennent pas compte du fait que les rendements diffèrent d'un secteur à un autre sont par conséquent erronés. Nous proposons enfin d'autres applications possibles de notre méthodologie.

Since Gary Becker’s (1964) seminal work, the theoretical and empirical literature on human capital has focused almost exclusively on general-purpose and firm-specific human capital. In this paper we discuss the implications of a third type of human capital, which we call task-specific, and which we believe is potentially as commonplace and as important as the two classic types. By task-specific human capital we mean that some of the human capital an individual acquires on the job is specific to the tasks being performed, as opposed to being specific to the firm. In other words, task-specific human capital is the simple but plausible idea that much of the human capital accumulated on the job is due to task-specific learning by doing. The idea of task-specific human capital is closely related to occupationand industryspecific human capital. In each case, human capital is specific to the nature of the work, not specific to the firm. Hence, when capital is accumulated, multiple firms value the capital, so most (or even all) of the value of the capital will be reflected in the worker’s wage. The main difference between the idea of task-specific human capital and occupationand industryspecific human capital is in how the idea is applied. We argue that task-specific human capital has much wider applicability than suggested (so far) by the occupationand industry-specific human-capital literatures; the specific issues we address are cohort effects, job design, and promotions. Another argument in the literature closely related to ours is the classic argument of Adam Smith (1776) in the Wealth of Nations concerning returns to specialization. Smith’s argument was that, due to learning-by-doing at the level of the task, productivity can be enhanced by having each job entail fewer tasks. We believe that Smith was correct in focusing on learningby-doing at the level of the task as an important idea for thinking about organizations. The goal of our paper is to describe some of the other implications of this idea for the design and operation of organizations.