We extend traditional agency theory by exploring the roles for formal measures when managerial behavior is not governed by rules, formulas, or contracts. Part I describes relational incentive contracts with informal weights on formal performance measures. More importantly, it also explores how formal measures could be used in models of informal management, such as adaptation and coordination, politics and influence, leadership, and informal authority. Part II considers the benefits from allowing key stakeholders to develop their own, potentially inferior, performance measures. The collaboration to create a “balanced scorecard” of performance measures can help change an organization's culture.

Organizations are all around us. Culture is trickier—to analyze and even to see. We consider both the effect of management on culture and the effect of culture on performance. We begin by describing an intervention that dramatically improved outcomes and conspicuously included a culture-change component. We then use details from this intervention to describe potential empirical analyses of the association between organizational culture and performance in this and similar settings. Finally, we describe opportunities for theoretical models to explore how and why organizational culture might influence organizational performance.