This paper examines the impact of capital structure changes which have no corporate tax consequences. Specifically, exchange offers involving preferred and common stock are analyzed. We find that systematic changes in firm value occur when companies announce preferred-for-common exchange offers. Consequently, we interpret our results to be consistent with a signalling hypothesis. We also find weaker evidence suggesting the existence of agency cost effects or wealth redistributions across security classes. Our findings imply that capital structure changes need not alter the tax status of the issuing firm to affect firm value.

This paper examines the impact of capital structure changes which have no corporate tax consequences. Specifically, exchange offers involving preferred and common stock are analyzed. We find that systematic changes in firm value occur when companies announce preferred‐for‐common exchange offers. Consequently, we interpret our results to be consistent with a signalling hypothesis. We also find weaker evidence suggesting the existence of agency cost effects or wealth redistributions across security classes. Our findings imply that capital structure changes need not alter the tax status of the issuing firm to affect firm value.

Some argue that managers effectively control corporate voting: hence the process is meaningless. Others contend that shareholder voting motivates managers to maximize firm value. We provide evidence on this debate by analyzing the results from a large sample of management-sponsored anti-takeover amendments. Our results do not support the extreme form of either hypothesis. The evidence suggests that shareholder voting is important and indicates the circumstances where voting is most likely to constrain managers. Our results also have implications for the use of voting in political and other non-corporate contexts.

While the value of listing equity securities has been researched extensively, no studies have examined the market reaction to the decision to list corporate debt. Since the listing of corporate bonds on the major exchanges is a significant corporate activity, this study examines the impact of bond listing on shareholder wealth. Using a variety of possible announcement dates as well as cumulative abnormal returns between dates, no detectable market reaction to debt listing is found. Therefore, the listing of corporate bonds does not appear to be valued by the common shareholders of those same firms.

The operation and characteristics of the American securities markets have long been major preoccupations of financial research, especially during the last decade. Particular attention has been devoted to the question of whether there exist investment strategies, or investing entities, capable of producing consistently superior investment performance. The general consensus to date is that few, if any, such success stories are observable. Examinations of the value of professional investment research and counsel ([7] [8] [9] [24]), of the payoff from technical trading rules ([11] [13] [18] [20] [26] [34]), and of the investment results of institutional money management ([15] [29] [25] [28]) have, in almost every instance, provided little indication of performance better than that attainable from a simple passive strategy of buying and holding a randomly selected, well-diversified portfolio of securities, after appropriate adjustments for portfolio risk levels are taken into account. The intensive competition in, and rapid information-digesting properties of, the capital market environment have been cited as explanations ([2] [5] [12]).

Theory suggests that shareholders who own blocks of stock have a stronger incentive to invest in voting on corporate issues than nonblockholders. Our evidence indicates that institutional investors and other blockholders vote more actively on antitakeover amendments than nonblockholders, and opposition by institutions is greater when the proposal appears to harm shareholders. Our evidence suggests that institutions that are less subject to management influence, such as mutual funds, foundations, and public-employee pension funds, are more likely to oppose management than banks, insurance companies, and trusts, which frequently derive benefits from lines of business under management control.

This study examines the stock price reaction around the announcement of proposed changes in long-term managerial compensation packages. The evidence indicates that on average these plans are met with positive market reactions, i.e., shareholder wealth increases. Further, we are unable to differentiate the market reaction to various types of long-range compensation schemes. This result is consistent with the notion that firms with different characteristics will resolve their managerial compensation requirements differently. Thus no particular compensation package necessarily dominates all others.

The authors investigate the importance of bid-ask spread-induced biases on event date returns as exemplified by seasoned equity offerings by NYSE listed firms. They document significant negative return biases on the offering day, which explain a large portion of the negative event date returns documented in the literature. Buy-sell order flow imbalance is prominent around the offering and induces a relatively large spread bias. If order imbalances are suspected, the researcher can use returns calculated from the midpoint of the closing bid and ask quotes instead of returns calculated from closing transaction prices to avoid this return bias.