[We study the effect of the Global Analyst Research Settlement and related regulations on sell-side research. These regulations attempted to mitigate the interdependence between research and investment banking. We document that following the regulations many brokerage houses have migrated from the traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier system. Optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less informative. Importantly, the overall informativeness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing optimistic recommendations no longer depends on affiliation with the covered firm, although affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations.]

We examine the cross‐sectional variation in the marginal value of corporate cash holdings that arises from differences in corporate financial policy. We begin by providing semi‐quantitative predictions for the value of an extra dollar of cash depending upon the likely use of that dollar, and derive a set of intuitive hypotheses to test empirically. By examining the variation in excess stock returns over the fiscal year, we find that the marginal value of cash declines with larger cash holdings, higher leverage, better access to capital markets, and as firms choose greater cash distribution via dividends rather than repurchases.

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.

Industry expertise is an important aspect of sell-side research. We explore this aspect using a novel dataset of industry recommendations, which are often issued by strategy analysts. We study sell-side analysts' ability to rank industries relative to each other (across-industry expertise), and how it relates to analysts' ability to rank firms in a particular industry (within-industry expertise). We find that analysts express more optimism towards industries with higher levels of investment, past profitability, and past returns. Analysts exhibit across-industry expertise, as portfolios based on industry recommendations generate abnormal returns over both short and long horizons, beyond what would be explained by industry momentum. Additionally, industry recommendations contain information, which is orthogonal to the information revealed in firm recommendations, and more so for brokers who benchmark their firm recommendations to industry peers. Consequently, the investment value of sell-side analysts' recommendations is enhanced when both dimensions of industry expertise are utilized by considering industry and firm recommendations in combination.

Analysts strategically allocate more effort to portfolio firms that are relatively more important to their careers. Thus, the other firms the analysts cover indirectly affect a firm’s information environment. Controlling for analyst and firm characteristics, we find that an analyst makes more accurate, frequent, and informative earnings forecasts and recommendations for firms ranked higher within her portfolio based on proxies for importance to institutions. A firm’s relative rank widely varies across analysts, but its information environment improves when a larger proportion of analysts consider it to be relatively important. Analysts experience more favorable career outcomes when strategically allocating their efforts. Received August 23, 2017; editorial decision June 27, 2018 by Editor Lauren Cohen.

We study the effect of the Global Analyst Research Settlement and related regulations on sell-side research. These regulations attempted to mitigate the interdependence between research and investment banking. We document that following the regulations many brokerage houses have migrated from the traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier system. Optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less informative. Importantly, the overall informativeness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing optimistic recommendations no longer depends on affiliation with the covered firm, although affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their recommendations. A buy for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its industry, while for other brokers, it means the stock is expected to outperform the market or some return threshold. We show that these stated benchmarks have implications for the distribution of recommendations, price reactions to recommendations, and the investment value of recommendations. We conclude that, depending on the question, academics may need to account for the benchmarks when studying analysts' outputs, and investors may find the benchmarks beneficial in interpreting analysts' advice.