This paper investigates the effectiveness of macroprudential policy to contain the systemic risk of European banks between 2000 and 2017. We use a new database (MaPPED) collected by experts at the ECB and national central banks with narrative information on a broad range of instruments which are tracked over their life cycle. Using a dynamic panel framework at a monthly frequency we assess the impact of macroprudential tools and their design on the banks’ systemic risk both in the short and the long run. We furthermore decompose the systemic risk measure in an individual bank risk component and a systemic linkage component. This is of particular interest because microprudential policy focuses on the tail risk of an individual bank while macroprudential policy targets systemic risk by addressing the interlinkages and common exposures across banks. In general, the announcements of macroprudential policy actions have a downward effect on bank systemic risk. On average, all banks benefit from macroprudential tools in terms of their individual risk. We find that credit growth tools and exposure limits exhibit the most pronounced downward effect on the individual risk component. However, we find evidence for a risk-shifting effect which is more pronounced for retail-oriented banks. The effects are heterogeneous across banks with respect to the systemic linkage component. Liquidity tools and measures aimed at increasing the resilience of banks decrease the systemic linkage of banks. Moreover, these tools appear to be most effective for distressed banks. Our results have implications for the optimal design of macroprudential instruments.

This paper examines the effects of bank business models on performance and risk for a sample of 505 banks from 30 European countries over the period from 1998 to 2013. We document that business models in the European banking sector are characterized by a continuum, rather than a discrete set, of possible strategies. Using factor analysis to identify business models, we can account for this continuity. To estimate the impact of business models on performance, we use a methodology that is able to separate short-run effects from the longer-term impact of business model choices. Our findings show that retail-oriented banks perform better in terms of both profitability and stability and that diversification is associated with higher profitability. We report substantial variation of business model effects over different bank types. Our results lend support to the new capital regulations proposed in the Basel III framework, but we also argue that business model considerations should be more fundamentally integrated in the post-crisis regulatory and supervisory practice.

Based on a sample of 492 takeovers we examine the performance effects of acquisitions and mergers between EC credit institutions over the period 1988–1993. The sample is subdivided according to the degree of managerial leverage on the part of the acquirer and the degree of operational integration. The results indicate that domestic mergers among equal-sized partners significantly increase the performance of the merged banks. Improvement of cost efficiency is also found in cross-border acquisitions. On the other hand, domestic takeovers are found to be influenced predominantly by defensive and managerial motives such as size maximization.

This paper investigates whether or not functionally diversified banks have a comparative advantage in terms of long-term performance/risk profile compared to their specialized competitors. To that end, this study uses market-based measures of return potential and bank risk. We calculate the franchise value over time of European banks as a measure of their long-run performance potential. In addition, we measure risk as both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk components derived from a bank stock return model. Finally, we analyze the return/risk trade-off implied in different functional diversification strategies using a panel data analysis over the period 1989–2004. A higher share of non-interest income in total income affects banks’ franchise values positively. Diversification of revenue streams from distinct financial activities increases the systematic risk of banks while the effect on the idiosyncratic risk component is non-linear and predominantly downward-sloping. These findings have conflicting implications for different stakeholders, such as investors, bank shareholders, bank managers and bank supervisors.

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.

This paper investigates how stock market investors perceive the impact of market structure and efficiency on the long-run performance potential of European banks. To that end, a modified Tobin’s Q ratio is introduced as a measure of bank franchise value. This measure is applied to discriminate between the market structure and efficient-structure hypotheses in a coherent forward-looking framework, in which differences in banks’ horizontal and vertical differentiation strategies are controlled for. The results show that banks with better management or production technologies possess a long-run competitive advantage. In addition, bank market concentration does not affect all banks equally. Only the banks with a large market share in a concentrated market are able to generate non-competitive rents. The paper further documents that the forward-looking, long-run perspective and the noise-adjustment of the performance measure overcome most of the drawbacks associated with testing these hypotheses in a multi-country set-up. Finally, notwithstanding the international expansion of bank activities, the harmonization of regulation and the macroeconomic convergence in the European Union (EU15), we still find that country-specific macroeconomic variables have a significant impact on bank performance. The findings indicate that there is a trade-off between competition and stability that should be taken into account when assessing mergers or acquisitions.

At the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the European Central Bank issued a strong recommendation towards banks to halt dividend payouts. The goal of this de facto dividend ban was to boost banks' capital to ensure the supply of credit. However, given the importance of dividends for investors, this unprecedented measure is likely to have impacted bank valuations. Hence, banks may have chosen to preserve their higher capital buffers to boost payouts after the lifting of the ban, rendering the intended positive effect on credit supply a priori uncertain. We first investigate the effect of the dividend ban announcement on euro area banks' valuations and find a significantly negative impact. Second, we show that banks significantly expanded credit supply in the syndicated loan market, without counteracting effect of the negative stock market reaction. Our findings are corroborated when we exploit the multi-bank nature of syndicated loans in a within-loan setup.

This paper uses Bayesian Model Averaging to examine the driving factors of equity returns of US Bank Holding Companies. BMA has as an advantage over OLS that it accounts for the considerable uncertainty about the correct set (model) of bank risk factors. We find that out of a broad set of 12risk factors only the market, real estate, and high-minus-low Fama–French factors are reliably related to US bank stock returns over the period 1986–2010. Other factors are either only relevant over specific subperiods or for subsets of bank holding companies. We discuss the implications of our findings for empirical banking research.

This paper addresses the pass-through from market interest rates to retail bank interest rates. The paper advocates a heterogeneous approach and applies it to the Belgian banking market. A substantial proportion of the heterogeneity in bank pricing policies can be explained by the bank lending channel and the relative market power hypothesis. The results also suggest that the long-term pass-through is typically less than one-for-one, rejecting the completeness hypothesis. While there is no convincing evidence for asymmetry in retail rates, large deviations from equilibrium mark-ups are faster reduced than small deviations. Overall, conditions for corporate loans are more competitive compared to consumer loans. Demand and savings deposits have, by far, the most rigid prices.

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership and bank capital. Using a large sample of U.S. banks, we show that banks with greater institutional ownership operate with substantially higher capital ratios. The results are robust to controlling for standard determinants of bank capital structure, including market- and accounting-based risk measures. The results hold both for indexers and non-indexers, indicating that the effect of institutional ownership on bank capital cannot be explained by self-selection. We further address endogeneity concerns using an instrumental variable strategy based on the inclusion of banks in the S&P index. We find supporting evidence that the superior monitoring abilities of institutional investors, which reduce the severity of agency costs, is the main explanation for our results.