Using a rich panel of owner-operated New York dairy farms, we provide new evidence on entrepreneurial behavior. We formulate a dynamic model of farms facing uninsured risks and financial constraints. Farmers derive nonpecuniary benefits from operating their businesses. We estimate the model via simulated minimum distance, matching both production and financial data. We find that financial factors and nonpecuniary benefits are of first-order importance. Collateral constraints and liquidity restrictions inhibit borrowing and the accumulation of capital, especially among high-productivity firms seeking to expand. The nonpecuniary benefits to farming are large and keep small, low-productivity farms in business. Although farmers are risk averse, eliminating uninsured production risk has only modest effects on capital and output.

Using confidential credit-registry data on the universe of bank loans, we characterize the monthly behavior of relationship lending in Chile between 2012 and 2019. We focus on two aspects of relationships between firms and banks: their closeness, and their concentration. We uncover four stylized facts about relationships lending: their behavior through time, cyclical properties, properties of credit contracts in relationships, and the effect of relationships on monetary policy transmission. Our results show that relationship lending plays an important role in credit allocation and in the implementation of financial policies.