In 2005, U.S. employers spent more than $500 billion on health insurance. I argue that firms invest in worker health to mitigate the depreciation in human capital that occurs when workers get sick, which increases the productivity of human and physical capital. Using firm-level health insurance data, I find firms that have higher labor productivity, spend more on research and development, and are larger invest more in health capital. Further, health capital investment positively affects firm value and overall productivity. To identify these effects, I instrument for insurance with state mandates and the number of persons covered by insurance contracts.

U.S. public-sector employers have promised over $1 trillion in retiree health and other post-employment benefits (OPEBs). We show that states with greater OPEB liabilities and lower funding ratios have higher municipal bond yields. The impact of OPEB liabilities on bond yields is comparable in size to that of pension liabilities but depends on distinct factors including the risk of rising health costs, plan risk-sharing mechanisms, and the employers’ ability to re-negotiate the plans with employees. Our results highlight how the size, funding level, and contracting environment of OPEB plans shape the risk-return profile of municipal bond investments.

Using a comprehensive data set of all U.S. investment in foreign equities, we find that the single most important determinant of the amount of U.S. investment a foreign firm receives is whether the firm cross‐lists on a U.S. exchange. Correcting for selection biases, cross‐listing leads to a doubling (or more) in U.S. investment, an impact greater than all other factors combined. Much of this increased U.S. investment is purchased in the foreign market, implying that the cross‐listing effect reflects something more fundamental about a firm than easier acquisition of its securities. We also demonstrate that cross‐listing is an important determinant of U.S. international investment at the country level and describe easy‐to‐implement methods for including a cross‐listing variable as an endogenous control.

Nonlinearities can arise in international investment factors because of a pecking order in barriers. When direct barriers are severe, improvements in governance factors such as rule of law and expropriation risk can increase investment. Only when severe barriers are ameliorated can factors such as firm-specific information, transaction costs and hedging motives become more important. Evidence from unconditional quantile regressions provides support for a pecking order hypothesis, as we find that investment factors vary across the distribution. Specifically, our empirical results indicate that access to basic information is important everywhere, governance and familiarity matter where barriers are high, roles for information and hedging motives become more apparent where barriers are moderate, and where there are no barriers small improvements in governance have little effect on investment. Going forward, analysis should incorporate nonlinearities inherent in cross-border barriers and investment.