[We provide new evidence linking board characteristics and performance. Using manually collected governance data from the mutual fund industry, we find an inverse relation between board size and fund performance. We also find evidence that organizational form plays an important role in determining operational performance. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that there may not be a single optimal board structure that is applicable to all funds, that attempts to regulate board attributes should be considered with caution, and that sponsor-level factors are important board structure considerations.]

Five methods of estimating the term structure from on-the-run Treasuries are compared with respect to error in spot rate estimation, forward rate estimation, and coupon bond pricing. The methods can all be considered variants of the bootstrapping technique. The two discrete-time bootstrapping methods are based on linear and cubic interpolation of the yield curve. Two continuous-time bootstrapping methods are based on exponential functional forms for the yield curve and a third is based on a bilinear transformation of a power function. Simulated bond samples with and without random error are employed to study the relative importance of interpolation error and random pricing error. CRSP bond data are used in assessing the accuracy of the methods in pricing liquid and illiquid bonds. Two methods stand out in terms of good interpolation properties and robustness in the face of pricing errors. These are the Nelson and Siegel and the Mansi and Phillips methods. Both are based on exponential functions.

We study the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on shareholder value. We argue that long-term investors can ensure that managers choose the amount of CSR that maximizes shareholder value. We find that long-term investors do increase the value to shareholders of CSR activities, not through higher cash flow but rather through lower cash flow risk. Following prior work, we use indexing by investors and state laws on stakeholder orientation for identification. Our findings suggest that CSR activities can create shareholder value as long as managers are properly monitored by long-term investors.

We examine the relation between auditor characteristics (quality and tenure) and the cost of debt financing. Consistent with the hypothesis that audit characteristics are important to the capital markets, we find that (1) auditor quality and tenure are negatively and significantly related to the cost of debt financing, (2) the relation between auditor characteristics and the cost of debt is most pronounced in firms with debt that is noninvestment grade, and (3) both the insurance and information role of audits are economically significant to the cost of debt. Overall, our results suggest that, through their dual roles of providing information and insurance, auditor quality and tenure matter to capital market participants.

We examine the relation between the cost of debt financing and a governance index that contains various antitakeover and shareholder protection provisions. Using firm-level data from the Investors Research Responsibility Center for the period 1990–2000, we find that antitakeover governance provisions lower the cost of debt financing. Segmenting the data into firms with the strongest management rights (strongest antitakeover provisions) and firms with the strongest shareholder rights (weakest antitakeover provisions), we find that strong antitakeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt financing while weak antitakeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt financing, with a difference of about 34 basis points between the two groups. Overall, the results suggest that antitakeover governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed favorably in the bond market.

We study the effect of investor horizons on a comprehensive set of corporate decisions. We argue that monitoring by long-term investors generates decision making that maximizes shareholder value. We find that long-term investors strengthen governance and restrain managerial misbehaviors such as earnings management and financial fraud. They discourage a range of investment and financing activities but encourage payouts. Innovation increases, in quantity and quality. Shareholders benefit through higher profitability that the stock market does not fully anticipate, and lower risk.

We examine whether media news reflect the extent to which issuing firms manage their earnings prior to their equity carve-outs (ECOs). We posit that managers will strategically respond to media requests prior to their equity offerings in order to signal their type and differentiate themselves from others. We find that media news at the time of the ECO is negatively related to earnings management during the year prior to the ECO date. However, when we examine the nature of media news (informative vs uninformative), we find that earnings management is negatively (positively) related to informative (uninformative) media news. Moreover, while price revision is positively related to both informative and uninformative media news, ECO underpricing is positively related to uninformative media news and negatively related to informative media news. This suggests that uninformative news induces investor sentiment during the first day of trading, whereas informative news reduces the asymmetric information between issuing firms and outside investors. Consistently, we document that long-run ECO performance decreases with earnings management and uninformative news, but is positively related to informative news. Our results highlight the importance of the nature of news in media coverage for issuers seeking to differentiate themselves from those managing their earnings prior to equity offerings, evidence consistent with signaling.

We examine whether short sellers in the equity market provide valuable information to investors in the bond market. Using a sample of publicly traded bond data covering the period from 1988 to 2011, we find that firms with high short interest have lower credit ratings and are more likely to have their ratings downgraded. We also find that firms with highly shorted stocks are associated with higher bond yield spreads (about 24 basis points). Evidence of causality from short interest spikes and a natural experiment based on the SEC's Regulation SHO pilot program confirms our findings. Overall, our results suggest that equity short sellers provide predictive information to creditors in the bond market. JEL Classifications: G12; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the study with the exception of the bond data from Lehman Brothers, which is a proprietary dataset.

We examine the role played by the parent’s motive in undertaking a carve-out; the parent’s post-IPO influence over the carved-out subsidiary; and anti-takeover provisions and industry structure of a carve-out on its acquisition likelihood and its acquisition premium. We find that the probability and hazard of a carve-out acquisition increase when the parent’s objective is to unlock the value of a subsidiary and when the parent and the subsidiary are tied with a product-market relationship. We also find that the post-IPO parent ownership significantly affects the acquisition likelihood and the level of acquisition premium. Additional analyses examining the post-IPO carve-out status suggest that the product-market relationship and post-IPO parent ownership increase the probability of re-acquisition.