We provide an empirical test of contrast effects—a bias where a decision maker perceives information in contrast to what preceded it—in the quasi-experimental context of speed dating decisions. We document that prior partner attractiveness reduces the subsequent likelihood of an affirmative dating decision. This relationship is confined to recent interactions, consistent with a perceptual error, but not learning or the presence of a quota in affirmative responses. The contrast effect is driven almost entirely by male evaluators. Additional evidence documents the effect's linearity with respect to prior partner attractiveness, its amplification for partners of moderate attractiveness, and its partial attenuation with accumulated experience.

We address the role of “psychological frictions” in the incomplete take-up of EITC benefits with an IRS field experiment. We specifically assess the influence of program confusion, informational complexity, and stigma by evaluating response to experimental mailings distributed to 35,050 tax filers who failed to claim $26 million despite an initial notice. While the mere receipt of the mailing, simplification, and the heightened salience of benefits led to substantial additional claiming, attempts to reduce perceived costs of stigma, application, and audits did not. The study, and accompanying surveys, suggests that low program awareness/understanding and informational complexity contribute to the puzzle of low take-up.

Policymakers have recently embraced Behavioral Economics as an alternative approach which recognizes the limits and consequences of human decision-making. Early applications of BE (“nudges”) produced notable successes and helped to set the stage for more aggressive applications aimed at the deeper causes of policy problems. We contend that policies that aspire to simplify products and incentives, rather than choice environments, aggressively protect consumers from behavioral exploitation, and leverage BE to enhance the design and implementation of traditional policy instruments offer solutions commensurate with contemporary challenges. Case studies in health insurance, privacy, and climate change illustrate the application of these ideas.

We examine the health plan choices that 23,894 employees at a U.S. firm made from a large menu of options that differed only in financial cost-sharing and premium. These decisions provide a clear test of the predictions of the standard economic model of insurance choice in the absence of choice frictions because plans were priced so that nearly every plan with a lower deductible was financially dominated by an otherwise identical plan with a high deductible. We document that the majority of employees chose dominated plans, which resulted in excess spending equivalent to 24% of chosen plan premiums. Low-income employees were significantly more likely to choose dominated plans, and most employees did not switch into more financially efficient plans in the subsequent year. We show that the choice of dominated plans cannot be rationalized by standard risk preference or any expectations about health risk. Testing alternative explanations with a series of hypothetical-choice experiments, we find that the popularity of dominated plans was not primarily driven by the size and complexity of the plan menu, nor informed preferences for avoiding high deductibles, but by employees’ lack of understanding of health insurance. Our findings challenge the standard practice of inferring risk preferences from insurance choices and raise doubts about the welfare benefits of health reforms that expand consumer choice.