Recent work in accounting suggests that managerial optimism can lead managers to escalate income‐increasing earnings management. In this paper, I examine how a fundamental attribute of the earnings management setting—the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal—serves as one potential source of managerial optimism. I conduct two experiments to test whether the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal systematically induces optimism that increases participants’ propensity to engage in behavior that is analogous to accruals‐based earnings management and to real earnings management, holding constant incentives, agency frictions, and the information environment. My results indicate that, independent of their innate optimism, the time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal likely encourages managers to overestimate their ability to compensate for current‐period earnings management through strong future performance. This optimism, in turn, likely increases managers’ propensity to engage in both forms of earnings management.

Accountants making judgments with respect to a particular set of standards are increasingly aware of standards from other reporting regimes that offer additional or conflicting guidance. In fact, IFRS encourages reliance on out‐of‐regime standards when IFRS lacks guidance. This paper reports the results of two experiments which provide evidence that auditors in such circumstances are vulnerable to contrast effects , whereby reporting judgments under IFRS are systematically influenced away from the accounting treatment supported by standards from another regime (U.S. GAAP ). Contrast effects are observed (i) when out‐of‐regime standards are considered before making a reporting judgment under IFRS , and (ii) when out‐of‐regime standards are applied as local GAAP for a subsidiary of a foreign parent that reports under IFRS . We also find that contrast effects are reduced when auditors believe IFRS lacks guidance. These results have implications for financial statement preparers and auditors in the current incomplete‐convergence environment.

ABSTRACT We examine how cautionary disclaimers about forward-looking statements affect investor judgments both before making an investment and after having suffered an investment loss. In our first experiment, a cautionary disclaimer appears to effectively communicate to nonprofessional investors that forward-looking statements may not be reliable, but we find little evidence that the disclaimer alters the extent to which forward-looking statements influence nonprofessional investors' valuation judgments. In our second experiment, we shift our focus to ex post judgments and find that the disclaimer influences the extent to which investors feel wronged and entitled to compensation after an investment loss, consistent with investors attending to the disclaimer and acting as if it were, ex ante, effective. Notably, investors continue to feel more wronged and entitled to financial compensation when available evidence suggests that management knowingly issued false or misleading forward-looking statements—even if disclaimed. Together, these results provide support for recent judicial efforts to erode the sweeping safe harbor provisions currently granted to companies. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

We use an experiment with experienced managers to provide more-direct evidence on how reporting goals and firm performance influence language choices. We find that bad news disclosures are less readable than good news, but only when managers have a stronger self-enhancement motive. Our results suggest that this difference is driven mainly by attempts to write more readable good news reports as opposed to intentional obfuscation of poor performance. In order to frame poor performance in a positive light, managers also focus more on the future, provide causal explanations for poor performance, and use more passive voice and fewer personal pronouns.

ABSTRACT Technological advances are creating a shift in the information disclosure environment allowing more investors to interact with management. We examine three key levels of trader‐management interaction to assess the accuracy of traders' market‐tested value estimates and resulting market price. These data require an engaging experiment and a complex, contextually rich asset, which we create by playing a popular gaming app before the experiment. Participants view financial information, ask management questions, estimate value, and trade. We find that receiving non‐personalized question responses improves trader estimates of value and market price efficiency relative to when traders ask questions but do not expect a response. This occurs because traders exert more effort estimating value and trading. However, receiving personalized versus non‐personalized responses harms value estimates and market efficiency. This occurs because traders receiving personalized responses fixate on the interaction with management, dividing their attention and diverting it away from valuing and trading the asset.

ABSTRACT Prior literature suggests that investors react less strongly to information in less readable disclosures. We extend this literature by considering how disclosure readability affects the sensitivity of investors' valuation judgments to the information contained in outside (i.e., non-firm) sources of information. Using an experiment, we present investors with a disclosure containing mixed news about the valence of firm performance, and this disclosure varies in readability. We find that investors who initially view a less readable firm disclosure provide valuation judgments that incorporate the outside information to a greater extent, such that their valuation judgments are more sensitive to whether outside information is relatively more or less supportive of management's positive forward-looking statements. We find evidence that this occurs primarily because investors who view a less readable initial disclosure feel less comfortable evaluating the firm and, in turn, rely more on the outside information. We also find that viewing a less readable firm disclosure indirectly increases the extent to which participants search outside information. Combined, our results suggest that investors' valuation judgments may be more influenced by outside sources of information when managers provide less readable firm disclosures, potentially limiting the extent to which managers can benefit from strategically issuing less readable disclosures to obfuscate poor performance. These findings also imply that investors might over-rely on more readable disclosures while discounting outside sources of information about the firm. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

ABSTRACT There is limited evidence on the construct validity of the dependent measures commonly used in the literature on nonprofessional investor judgments. In this paper, we first survey the literature to understand the types of dependent measures typically used by researchers. We then conduct factor analyses to uncover linkages between dependent measures and the constructs underlying these nonprofessional investor judgments. Our results suggest that, while the wide variety of dependent measures can appear on their face to represent many nuanced economic constructs, these measures capture three distinct factors. These factors relate to nonprofessional investors’ (1) expectations regarding future firm performance and value, (2) holistic perceptions of the firm, and (3) evaluations of the risk associated with investing in the firm. Next, we provide recommendations for selecting, analyzing, and reporting dependent measures in future research. Finally, we provide directions for future research to further our understanding of the judgments made by investors.

ABSTRACT To what extent do U.S. consumers change their purchase behavior or, in the extreme, boycott companies based on negative information about corporate tax activities? Practitioner publications and academic research identify consumers as a key corporate tax stakeholder. But we have limited empirical evidence whether information about corporate tax activities influences consumer actions. We undertake a comprehensive study of this question, triangulating across several settings. First, a representative sample of consumers suggests they rarely boycott in response to corporate tax activities. Next, an analysis of granular retail scanner data fails to provide compelling evidence of consumer purchase responses to negative tax news. An analysis of individual foot traffic at retail establishments around negative tax news again fails to suggest U.S. consumers change their shopping activities in response to negative tax news. The combined evidence suggests consumers do not meaningfully alter their purchase behavior in response to negative tax news. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; H25; H26.

ABSTRACT This paper discusses the role of process evidence in accounting research. We define process evidence broadly as data providing insight into how and why cause-effect relationships occur, and we provide a framework to guide the provision and evaluation of process evidence in accounting studies. Our definition allows for an expanded understanding of techniques for gathering process evidence. The framework highlights the importance of the study's goals and theory in choosing how to provide process evidence, as well as how much process evidence to provide. The paper also outlines the strengths and limitations of three approaches to providing process evidence: mediation, moderation, and multiple-study-based designs. We provide recommendations for best practices for each approach to minimize threats to validity and maximize the value of process evidence.